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Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium

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  • John Hillas

    (SUNY at Stony Brook)

  • Elon Kohlberg

    (Harvard)

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    Abstract

    The central concept of noncooperative game theory is that of the \emph{strategic equilibrium} (or Nash equilibrium, or noncooperative equilibrium). In this chapter we discuss some of the conceptual issues surrounding this concept and its refinements. Many of these issues have received increasing attention in the last few years. We are not at all comprehensive in covering the approaches that have been taken to the question. In particular, we focus almost exclusively on the ``purely rational'' approach and say almost nothing about other approaches. We do survey some of the issues and approaches that do not fit neatly into the core of our argument in the final section.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9606002.

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    Length: 2 pages
    Date of creation: 30 Jun 1996
    Date of revision: 18 Sep 1996
    Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9606002

    Note: Type of Document - AMS LaTeX; prepared on IBM PC - emTEX ; to print on HP/PostScript; pages: 2 + 63; figures: included . Prepared for the \emph{Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications} edited by Robert J. Aumann and Sergiu Hart. Comments still welcomed by the authors, perhaps not by the editors. Postscript file redone embedding type 1 versions of the fonts, in the hope that a dpf file will be generated and the postsctipt file made directly available.
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    Related research

    Keywords: strategic equilibrium; Nash equilibrium; strategic stability; equilibrium refinements;

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    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "On Rationalizability in Extensive Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 40-61, May.
    2. Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L. & Swinkels, J., 1990. "Extensive Form Reasoning In Normal Form Games," Papers 1-90-1, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
    3. Jean-François Mertens, 2004. "Ordinality in non cooperative games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 32(3), pages 387-430, 06.
    4. G. Noldeke & L. Samuelson, 2010. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Backward and Forward Induction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 538, David K. Levine.
    5. John Hillas & Dries Vermeulen & Mathijs Jansen, 1996. "On the Finiteness of Stable Sets," Game Theory and Information 9605003, EconWPA, revised 15 Jun 1996.
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    7. Binmore, Ken, 1987. "Modeling Rational Players: Part I," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(02), pages 179-214, October.
    8. John Hillas, 1996. "On the Relation Between Perfect Equilibria in Extensive Form Games and Proper Equilibria in Normal Form Games," Game Theory and Information 9605002, EconWPA, revised 14 May 1996.
    9. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1996. "Strategic Rationality Orderings and the Best Rationalization Principle," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 178-200, April.
    10. Adam Brandenburger, 1992. "Knowledge and Equilibrium in Games," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(4), pages 83-101, Fall.
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    13. Aumann, Robert J., 1995. "Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 6-19.
    14. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1986. " Axiomatic Characterizations of Rational Choice in Strategic Environme nts," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 88(3), pages 473-88.
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    21. Hart, Sergiu, 1992. "Games in extensive and strategic forms," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 19-40 Elsevier.
    22. repec:nys:sunysb:91-24 is not listed on IDEAS
    23. Van Damme, Eric, 2002. "Strategic equilibrium," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 41, pages 1521-1596 Elsevier.
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    25. R. J. Aumann & M. Maschler, 1972. "Some Thoughts on the Minimax Principle," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 18(5-Part-2), pages 54-63, January.
    26. Robert J. Aumann, 2010. "Correlated Equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian Rationality," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000377, David K. Levine.
    27. R. Aumann, 2010. "Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies," Levine's Working Paper Archive 389, David K. Levine.
    28. Binmore, Ken, 1988. "Modeling Rational Players: Part II," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 4(01), pages 9-55, April.
    29. Lawrence E. Blume & William R. Zame, 1993. "The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9309001, EconWPA.
    30. Blume, Lawrence & Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1991. "Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 81-98, January.
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    39. Robert J. Aumann, 1999. "Interactive epistemology I: Knowledge," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 263-300.
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