References listed on IDEAS
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1. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1996. "Strategic Rationality Orderings and the Best Rationalization Principle," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 178-200, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. P. Battigalli & M. Siniscalchi, 1999. "Interactive Beliefs and Forward Induction," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 99f3, Economics Department, Princeton University.
   Other versions:
   • Battigalli, P. & Siniscalchi, M., 1999. "Interactive Beliefs and Forward Induction," Economics Working Papers eco99/15, European University Institute.
3. Asheim,G.B., 1999. "On the epistemic foundation for backward induction," Memorandum 30/1999, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Asheim, Geir B., 2002. "On the epistemic foundation for backward induction," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 121-144, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Asheim,G.B. & Dufwenberg,M., 2000. "Admissibility and common belief," Memorandum 07/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Asheim, Geir B. & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2000. "Amissibility and Common Belief," Research Papers in Economics 2000:6, Stockholm University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Asheim, Geir B. & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2003. "Admissibility and common belief," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 208-234, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Reny, Philip J, 1992. "Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(3), pages 627-49, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1991. "Comments on the Interpretation of Game Theory," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 909-24, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Reny Philip J., 1993. "Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 257-274, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Samuelson, L., 1991. "Dominated Strategies and Common Knowledge," Papers 9110, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
   Other versions:
   • Samuelson, L., 1989. "Dominated Strategies And Common Knowledge," Papers 1-89-3, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
   • Samuelson, L., 1990. "Dominated Strategies And Common Knowledge," Working papers 90-14, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
   • Samuelson, L., 1989. "Dominated Strategies And Common Knowledge," Papers 5-89-6, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
9. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. van Damme,Eric, 1987. "Stable equilibria and forward induction," Discussion Paper Serie A 128, University of Bonn, Germany.
    Other versions:
    • van Damme, Eric, 1989. "Stable equilibria and forward induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 476-496, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Samuelson, Larry, 1992. "Dominated strategies and common knowledge," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 284-313, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 1990. "Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 243-267, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Drew Fudenberg & Eddie Dekel, 1987. "Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty," Working papers 471, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
13. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-28, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Mailath, George J & Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M, 1993. "Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(2), pages 273-302, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L. & Swinkels, J., 1991. "extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games," Papers 9130, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    • Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L. & Swinkels, J., 1990. "Extensive Form Reasoning In Normal Form Games," Papers 1-90-1, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
    • Mailath, G.J. & Samuelson, L. & Swinkels, J., 1990. "Extensive Form Reasoning In Normal Form Games," Working papers 90-13, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
15. Basu, Kaushik, 1990. "On the Non-existence of a Rationality Definition for Extensive Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 33-44.
16. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1981. "Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 92-100, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Borgers, Tilman & Samuelson, Larry, 1992. ""Cautious" Utility Maximization and Iterated Weak Dominance," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 13-25.
18. Blume, Lawrence & Brandenburger, Adam & Dekel, Eddie, 1991. "Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(1), pages 61-79, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "On Rationalizability in Extensive Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 40-61, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • David M Kreps & Robert Wilson, 2003. "Sequential Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000813, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Ignacio Palacios-Huerta & Oscar Volij, . "Field Centipedes," Economic theory and game theory 020, Oscar Volij. [Downloadable!]
2. Sabrina Teyssier, 2007. "Optimal Group Incentives with Social Preferences and Self-Selection," Working Papers 0710, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
3. Asheim,G.B. & Dufwenberg,M., 2000. "Admissibility and common belief," Memorandum 07/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Asheim, Geir B. & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2000. "Amissibility and Common Belief," Research Papers in Economics 2000:6, Stockholm University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Asheim, Geir B. & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2003. "Admissibility and common belief," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 208-234, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Sabrina Teyssier, 2007. "Optimal Group Incentives with Social Preferences and Self-Selection," Post-Print halshs-00144901_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]