IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/fth/teavsa/14-92.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backward Induction in Perfect Information Games

Author

Listed:
  • Ben-Porath, E.

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Ben-Porath, E., 1992. "Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backward Induction in Perfect Information Games," Papers 14-92, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
  • Handle: RePEc:fth:teavsa:14-92
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Antonio Quesada, 2002. "Belief system foundations of backward induction," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 393-403, December.
    2. Battigalli Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi Marciano, 2003. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-46, June.
    3. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Bonanno, Giacomo, 1999. "Recent results on belief, knowledge and the epistemic foundations of game theory," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 149-225, June.
    4. Ken Binmore, 1997. "Rationality and backward induction," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 4(1), pages 23-41.
    5. Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 165-185, December.
    6. Vincent J. Vannetelbosch & P. Jean-Jacques Herings, 2000. "The equivalence of the Dekel-Fudenberg iterative procedure and weakly perfect rationalizability," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 15(3), pages 677-687.
    7. Steven D. Levitt & John A. List & Sally E. Sadoff, 2011. "Checkmate: Exploring Backward Induction among Chess Players," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 975-990, April.
    8. Pierpaolo Battigalli, 2006. "Rationalization In Signaling Games: Theory And Applications," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 8(01), pages 67-93.
    9. Dieter Balkenborg & Josef Hofbauer & Christoph Kuzmics, 2015. "The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(1), pages 165-193, February.
    10. John Hillas & Elon Kohlberg, 1996. "Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9606002, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 18 Sep 1996.
    11. Bonanno, Giacomo, 2013. "A dynamic epistemic characterization of backward induction without counterfactuals," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 31-43.
    12. Itzhak Gilboa, 1993. "Can Free Choice Be Known?," Discussion Papers 1055, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    13. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 1999. "Hierarchies of Conditional Beliefs and Interactive Epistemology in Dynamic Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 188-230, September.
    14. Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, "undated". "Intersubjective Consistency Of Knowledge And Belief," Department of Economics 98-03, California Davis - Department of Economics.
    15. Samet, Dov, 1996. "Hypothetical Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 230-251, December.
    16. Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, "undated". "Introduction To The Semantics Of Belief And Common Belief," Department of Economics 97-19, California Davis - Department of Economics.
    17. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Siniscalchi, Marciano, 1997. "An Epistemic Characterization of Extensive Form Rationalizability," Working Papers 1009, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
    18. Giacomo Bonanno, 2011. "Reasoning about strategies and rational play in dynamic games," Working Papers 1111, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    19. Andres Perea, 2010. "Backward Induction versus Forward Induction Reasoning," Games, MDPI, vol. 1(3), pages 1-21, July.
    20. Barelli, Paulo & Galanis, Spyros, 2013. "Admissibility and event-rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 77(1), pages 21-40.
    21. Tore Ellingsen & Magnus Johannesson, 2004. "Is There a Hold‐up Problem?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 106(3), pages 475-494, October.
    22. Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, "undated". "Intersubjective Consistency Of Knowledge And Belief," Department of Economics 98-03, California Davis - Department of Economics.
    23. Ishikawa, Ryuichiro & 石川, 竜一郎 & Matsuhisa, Takashi & 松久, 隆, 2002. "Rationality on Final Decisions Leads to Sequential Equilibrium," Discussion Papers 2002-02, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    24. Andrés Perea, 2006. "Proper belief revision and rationalizability in dynamic games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 34(4), pages 529-559, November.
    25. Stuart, Harborne Jr., 1997. "Common Belief of Rationality in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 133-143, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    game theory ; information;

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:fth:teavsa:14-92. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thomas Krichel (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/setauil.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.