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Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backward Induction in Perfect Information Games

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Author Info
Ben-Porath, E.
Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies in its series Papers with number 14-92.

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Length: 37 pages
Date of creation: 1992
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:teavsa:14-92

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Tel-Aviv University, The Sackler Institute of Economic Studies, Ramat Aviv 69 978 Tel-Aviv, Israel
Phone: +972-3-640-9715
Fax: +972-3-640-9908
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Web page: http://econ.tau.ac.il/
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Related research
Keywords: game theory ; information;

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