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On the Relation Between Perfect Equilibria in Extensive Form Games and Proper Equilibria in Normal Form Games

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Author Info
John Hillas (SUNY at Stony Brook)
Abstract

This paper examines the question of the extent to which it is true that any equilibrium that is quasi-perfect in any extensive form game having a given normal form is necessarily proper. If one fixes not only the equilibrium in question but also a a sequence of completely mixed strategies converging to that equilibrium then indeed the notions are equivalent. However the stronger result is not true. An example of a normal form game is given in which there is an equilibrium that is quasi-perfect in any extensive form game having a given normal form but not proper.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 9605002.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 1 pages
Date of creation: 14 May 1996
Date of revision: 14 May 1996
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:9605002

Note: Type of Document - AMSLaTeX2e; prepared on IBM PC - emTeX; to print on PostScript; pages: 1 + 9 ; figures: included
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: perfect equilibrium; quasi-perfect equilibrium; proper equilibrium; strategicý equilibrium.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. repec:att:wimass:199611 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. George J. Mailath & Larry Samuelson & Jeroen M. Swinkels, . "How Proper is Sequential Equilibrium," ELSE working papers 045, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution. [Downloadable!]
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  3. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-37, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. John Hillas & Elon Kohlberg, 1996. "Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9606002, EconWPA, revised 18 Sep 1996. [Downloadable!]
  2. Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2007. "'On Forward Induction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 321307000000000825, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
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