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Strategic irrationality in extensive games

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Author Info
Basu, Kaushik

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.

Volume (Year): 15 (1988)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 247-260
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Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:15:y:1988:i:3:p:247-260

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565

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  1. Antonio Quesada, 2002. "Belief system foundations of backward induction," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 393-403, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1999. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 172, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. John Hillas & Elon Kohlberg, 1996. "Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9606002, EconWPA, revised 18 Sep 1996. [Downloadable!]
  4. Jorn Rothe, 2000. "Uncertainty Aversion and Backward Induction," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1610, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  5. Basu, Kaushik, 2004. "Consumer Cognition and Pricing in the 9's in Oligopolistic Markets," Working Papers 04-04, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Geoffrey Dunbar & Juan Tu & Ruqu Wang & Xiaoting Wang, 2006. "Rationalizing Irrational Beliefs," Working Papers 1033, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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