Strategic irrationality in extensive games
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Mathematical Social Sciences.
Volume (Year): 15 (1988)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505565
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