A New and Robust Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of Triadic Power Relations
AbstractWe present a new subgame perfect equilibrium in an infinitely repeated game, which has Basu's triadic model as the stage game. The payoff for the laborer is the same as in Basu's model. The equilibrium is more robust than the solution in Naqvi and Wemhoner in the sense that the equilibrium does not require the same high degree of rationality; simple well-known strategies are applied, and both the lanklord and the merchant are better of than in the stage game.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Bergen in its series Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen with number 2400.
Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, University of Bergen Fosswinckels Gate 6. N-5007 Bergen, Norway
Web page: http://www.uib.no/econ/
More information through EDIRC
GAMES ; LABOUR ; POWER GENERATION;
Other versions of this item:
- Hatlebakk, Magnus, 2002. "A new and robust subgame perfect equilibrium in a model of triadic power relations," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 225-232, June.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- O12 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
- Q12 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Espen Villanger, 2006. "Is Bonded Labor Voluntary? Evidence from the Liberation of the Kamaiyas in the Far-Western Region of Nepal," CMI Working Papers 16, CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway.
- Espen Villanger, 2006. "Is bonded labor voluntary? A framework against forced work," CMI Working Papers WP 2006: 7, CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway.
- Hatlebakk, Magnus, 2002. "Triadic Power Relations with Production, External Markets and Multiple Agents," Working Papers 02-18, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
- Magnus Hatlebakk, 2006. "The effects of agrarian contracts of a governmental intervention into bonded labor in the western terai of Nepal," CMI Working Papers WP 2006: 6, CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway.
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