We present a new subgame perfect equilibrium in an infinitely repeated game, which has Basu's triadic model as the stage game. The payoff for the laborer is the same as in Basu's model. The equilibrium is more robust than the solution in Naqvi and Wemhoner in the sense that the equilibrium does not require the same high degree of rationality; simple well-known strategies are applied, and both the lanklord and the merchant are better of than in the stage game.
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Length: 12 pages Date of creation: 2000 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:fth:bereco:2400
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Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games O12 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development Q12 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Micro Analysis of Farm Firms, Farm Households, and Farm Input Markets
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