The UN estimates that 20 million are held in bonded labor. Several economic analyses assert that bonded laborers accept these contracts voluntarily, which could imply that a ban would make such laborers worse off. We question the voluntary nature of bonded labor, discuss different theories and new evidence on the issue, and propose a new mechanism whereby landlords keep workers trapped. With different types of landlords not revealed to the laborer, we show how some landlords manipulate loan terms so that the laborer becomes bonded if future labor is rendered as collateral. Enforcement mechanisms and the monopolistic market for credit thus play a joint role. Providing alternative sources of credit, offering proper conflict resolution institutions for settling labor-contract disputes and banning the practice of bonded labor could emancipate bonded laborers, which would make them better off.
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Paper provided by CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway in its series CMI Working Papers with number
WP 2006:16.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D40 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - General J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
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Mukherjee, Anindita & Ray, Debraj, 1995.
"Labor tying,"
Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 207-239, August.
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