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Strategic Irrationality in Extensive Games

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  • Kaushik Basu

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Paper provided by David K. Levine in its series Levine's Working Paper Archive with number 375.

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Date of creation: 10 Dec 2010
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Handle: RePEc:cla:levarc:375

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References

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  1. David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1998. "Sequential Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 237, David K. Levine.
  2. McLennan, Andrew, 1985. "Justifiable Beliefs in Sequential Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 889-904, July.
  3. David Kreps & Paul Milgrom & John Roberts & Bob Wilson, 2010. "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," Levine's Working Paper Archive 239, David K. Levine.
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Cited by:
  1. Kaushik Basu, 2004. "Consumer Cognition and Pricing in the 9's in Oligopolistic Markets," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research 2053, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  2. Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, . "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," ELSE working papers, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution 040, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  3. Hatlebakk, Magnus, 2002. "A new and robust subgame perfect equilibrium in a model of triadic power relations," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 225-232, June.
  4. Weibull, Jörgen W., 1992. "An Introduction to Evolutionary Game Theory," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics 347, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  5. Jorn Rothe, 2000. "Uncertainty Aversion and Backward Induction," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society 1610, Econometric Society.
  6. Geoffrey Dunbar & Juan Tu & Ruqu Wang & Xiaoting Wang, 2006. "Rationalizing Irrational Beliefs," Working Papers, Queen's University, Department of Economics 1033, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  7. Battigalli, Pierpaolo, 1997. "On Rationalizability in Extensive Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 40-61, May.
  8. Banerjee, Abhijit & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1992. "Evolution and Rationality: Some Recent Game-Theoretic Results," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics 345, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  9. John Hillas & Elon Kohlberg, 1996. "Foundations of Strategic Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 9606002, EconWPA, revised 18 Sep 1996.
  10. Antonio Quesada, 2002. "Belief system foundations of backward induction," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 393-403, December.

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