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• Antonio Quesada

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Article provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.

Volume (Year): 53 (2002)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 393-403
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Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:53:y:2002:i:4:p:393-403

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Related research

Keywords: Backward induction; Bonanno's belief systems; Perfect information game; Rationality;

References listed on IDEAS
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1. Samet, Dov, 1996. "Hypothetical Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 230-251, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Bonanno, Giacomo, 2001. "Branching Time, Perfect Information Games, and Backward Induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 57-73, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Frank Schuhmacher, 1999. "Proper rationalizability and backward induction," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 599-615. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Binmore, Ken, 1996. "A Note on Backward Induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 135-137, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Aumann, Robert J., 1996. "Reply to Binmore," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 138-146, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Basu, Kaushik, 1988. "Strategic irrationality in extensive games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 247-260, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Reny Philip J., 1993. "Common Belief and the Theory of Games with Perfect Information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 257-274, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1007-28, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Bonanno, G., 1991. "Rational Beliefs in Extensive Games," Papers 383, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.
10. Basu, Kaushik, 1990. "On the Non-existence of a Rationality Definition for Extensive Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 19(1), pages 33-44.
11. Stalnaker, Robert, 1998. "Belief revision in games: forward and backward induction1," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 31-56, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Pearce, David G, 1984. "Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(4), pages 1029-50, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Balkenborg, Dieter & Winter, Eyal, 1997. "A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 325-345, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Balkenborg, Dieter & Eyal Winter, 1995. "A Necessary and Sufficient Epistemic Condition for Playing Backward Induction," Discussion Paper Serie B 331, University of Bonn, Germany.
14. Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Bonanno, Giacomo, 1999. "Synchronic information, knowledge and common knowledge in extensive games," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 77-99, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Bonanno, G., 1989. "The Logic Of Rational Play In Games Of Perfect Information," Papers 347, California Davis - Institute of Governmental Affairs.

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-5.