Synchronic information, knowledge and common knowledge in extensive games
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Research in Economics.
Volume (Year): 53 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622941
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- Ahti Pietarinen, 2003. "A Note on the Structural Notion of Information in Extensive Form Games," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 91-98, February.
- Bonanno, Giacomo, 2003. "A syntactic characterization of perfect recall in extensive games," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 201-217, September.
- Antonio Quesada, 2002. "Belief system foundations of backward induction," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 393-403, December.
- Giacomo Bonanno, 2009. "A characterization of sequential equilibrium in terms of AGM belief revision," Working Papers 914, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
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