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Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction

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  • Giacomo Bonanno

    (University of California)

Abstract

Doxastic characterizations of the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes and of the set of backward-induction outcomes are provided for general perfect-information games (where there may be multiple backward-induction solutions). We use models that are behavioral, rather than strategy-based, where a state only specifies the actual play of the game and not the hypothetical choices of the players at nodes that are not reached by the actual play. The analysis is completely free of counterfactuals and no belief revision theory is required, since only the beliefs at reached histories are specified.

Suggested Citation

  • Giacomo Bonanno, 2018. "Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 47(3), pages 1001-1032, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:47:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s00182-017-0595-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-017-0595-5
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    2. Christian W. Bach & Jérémie Cabessa, 2023. "Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium," Post-Print hal-04271274, HAL.
    3. Giacomo Bonanno, 2021. "Rational play in games: A behavioral approach," Working Papers 344, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.

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