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On some geometry and equivalence classes of normal form games

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  • Fabrizio Germano

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Abstract

Equivalence classes of normal form games are defined using the geometry of correspondences of standard equilibiurm concepts like correlated, Nash, and robust equilibrium or risk dominance and rationalizability. Resulting equivalence classes are fully characterized and compared across different equilibrium concepts for 2 x 2 games. It is argued that the procedure can lead to broad and game-theoretically meaningful distinctions of games as well as to alternative ways of viewing and testing equilibrium concepts. Larger games are also briefly considered.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 34 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 561-581

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:34:y:2006:i:4:p:561-581

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Related research

Keywords: Non-cooperative games; Classification; Equivalence; Invariance; Experimental games; Geometry of games; C70; C72; C78; C90; C91;

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