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Transfer, Focality and Coordination: Some Experimental Results

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Giovanna Devetag

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Abstract

In this paper we test the degree of tranfer of learning between two similar, n-player coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria with fixed cohorts. Our results show that achieve the payoff-dominants equilibrium in one game are then able to transfer this mutual best response outcome to the new game. However, cohorts which do not converge to the best outcome in the first game are not able to recover from coordination failure in the new game. Furthermore, the effects of tranfer on collective coordination change depending on the sequence with which the two games are played.

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Paper provided by Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy in its series LEM Papers Series with number 2000/02.

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Date of creation: 05 Dec 2000
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Handle: RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2000/02

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  1. Straub, Paul G., 1995. "Risk dominance and coordination failures in static games," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 339-363. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384.
  3. Gary Bornstein & Uri Gneezy & Rosemarie Nagel, 1999. "The Effect of Intergroup Competition on Group Coordination: An Experimental Study," Economics Working Papers 393, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Cooper, Russell & John, Andrew, 1988. "Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(3), pages 441-63, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Ho, Teck-Hua & Camerer, Colin & Weigelt, Keith, 1998. "Iterated Dominance and Iterated Best Response in Experimental "p-Beauty Contests."," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(4), pages 947-69, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Sugden, Robert, 1995. "A Theory of Focal Points," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(430), pages 533-50, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Vincent P. Crawford, 1995. "Theory and Experiment in the Analysis of Strategic Interaction," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 95-37, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  8. Nagel, Rosemarie, 1995. "Unraveling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(5), pages 1313-26, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Paul David & Edward Steinmueller, 2003. "Introduction," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 12(1), pages 1-3, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Vincent P. Crawford, 1990. "An 'Evolutionary' Interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's Experimental Results on Coordination," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 89-28r, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
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  11. Ochs, Jack, 1990. "The Coordination Problem in Decentralized Markets: An Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 545-59, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Meyer, Donald J, et al, 1992. "History's Role in Coordinating Decentralized Allocation Decisions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(2), pages 292-316, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A., 2005. "An experimental study of costly coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 349-364, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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