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A Theory of Focal Points

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Author Info
Sugden, Robert

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Abstract

The paper presents a theoretical framework that distinguishes between the strategic structure of a game (the existential game) and the way the players describe the game to themselves. Each player works with a private description of the game in which strategies are identified by labels; labels are generated by a stochastic labeling procedure. Each player chooses a decision rule which, for each possible private description, picks one of the available strategy labels. A criterion of collective rationality is applied to choices among decision rules. The implications of collective rationality are explored for a range of games with different labeling procedures. Copyright 1995 by Royal Economic Society.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 105 (1995)
Issue (Month): 430 (May)
Pages: 533-50
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Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:105:y:1995:i:430:p:533-50

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  1. Lorenzo Sacconi & Stefano Moretti, 2002. "Fuzzy norms, default reasoning and equilibrium selection in games under unforeseen contingencies and incomplete knowledge (new edition)," LIUC Papers in Ethics, Law and Economics 104, Cattaneo University (LIUC). [Downloadable!]
  2. J. Van Huyck & R. Battalio & F. Rankin, 1996. "On the Evolution of Convention: Evidence from Coordination Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 548, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. David Dickinson & Lynn Hunnicutt, 2005. "Nonbinding Suggestions: The Relative Effects of Focal Points versus Uncertainty Reduction on Bargaining Outcomes," Working Papers 05-13, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Nick Feltovich & John Duffy, 2004. "Words, Deeds and Lies: Strategic Behavior in Games with Multiple Signals," Working Papers 2004-01, Department of Economics, University of Houston. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Robert Sugden, 2001. "The evolutionary turn in game theory," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 113-130, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Antoni Bosch-Domènech & Nicolaas J. Vriend, 2008. "On the Role of Non-equilibrium Focal Points as Coordination Devices," Economics Working Papers 1064, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Edward Cartwright & Myrna Wooders, 2005. "Correlated Equilibrium and Behavioral Conformity," Working Papers 0526, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Nicoali J. Foss & Mark Lorenzen, . "Cognitive Coordination and Economic Organization: Analogy and the Emergence of Focal Points," IVS/CBS Working Papers 2001-2, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy, Copenhagen Business School. [Downloadable!]
  9. V. Bhaskar, 1997. "Breaking the Symmetry: Optimal Conventions in Repeated Symmetric Games," Game Theory and Information 9706001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  10. Rosenkranz, Stephanie & Weitzel, Utz, 2005. "Is It Trust we Model? An Attempt to Calculate the Non-Calculative," CEPR Discussion Papers 5067, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Giovanna Devetag, 2000. "Transfer, Focality and Coordination: Some Experimental Results," LEM Papers Series 2000/02, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  12. Swee Hoon Chuah & Robert Hoffmann & Lee Chew Ging, 2004. "Coordination and Incomplete Information: an Experimental Study," Occasional Papers 7, Industrial Economics Division. [Downloadable!]
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  13. Maria Demertzis & Nicola Viegi, 2008. "Inflation Targets as Focal Points," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 4(1), pages 55-87, March. [Downloadable!]
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  14. R. Joosten, 2007. "Strategic Advertisement with Externalities: A New Dynamic Approach," Papers on Econonmics and Evolution 2007-02, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group. [Downloadable!]
  15. Kets, Willemien & Voorneveld, Mark, 2005. "Learning to be prepared," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 590, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  16. Andreas Blume & Andreas Blume & Uri Gneezy, 2008. "Cognitive Forward Induction and Coordination without Common Knowledge: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 346, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised May 2008. [Downloadable!]
  17. Nicolas Bardsley & Judith Mehta & Chris Starmer & Robert Sugden, 2006. "The Nature of Salience Revisited: Cognitive Hierarchy Theory versus Team Reasoning," Discussion Papers 2006-17, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
  18. Jonathan Beck, 2004. "Fixed, Focal, Fair? Book Prices Under Optional Resale Price Maintenance," CIG Working Papers SP II 2004-15, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
  19. Roberto Scazzieri, 2001. "Patterns of rationality and the varieties of inference," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 105-110, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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