1. COOPER, R. & DEJONG, D.V. & FORSYTHE, R. & Tom Ross, 1989. "Communication In Coordination Games," Carleton Industrial Organization Research Unit (CIORU) 89-07, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
2. Nalbantian, Haig R & Schotter, Andrew, 1997. "Productivity under Group Incentives: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 314-41, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Nalbantian, Haig & Schotter, Andrew, 1994. "Productivity Under Group Incentives: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 94-04, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
3. Cooper, Russell, et al, 1990. "Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 218-33, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
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1. Giovanna Devetag, 2000. "Transfer, Focality and Coordination: Some Experimental Results," LEM Papers Series 2000/02, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy. [Downloadable!]
2. Rosemarie Nagel, 2001. "Comment," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 61, pages 03, Janvier-M. [Downloadable!]
3. Stefania Bortolotti & Giovanna Devetag & Andreas Ortmann, 2009. "Exploring the effects of real effort in a weak-link experiment," CEEL Working Papers 0901, Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia. [Downloadable!]
4. Roberto A. Weber, 2006. "Managing Growth to Achieve Efficient Coordination in Large Groups," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 114-126, March. [Downloadable!]
5. Giovanna Devetag, 2000. "Coordination in "Critical Mass" Games: An Experimental Study," LEM Papers Series 2000/03, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy. [Downloadable!]
6. Quazi Shahriar & Subhasish Dugar, 2009. "Focal Points and Economic Efficiency: Role of Relative Label Salience," Working Papers 0033, San Diego State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
7. Philippe Raab & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2004. "Cournot Competition between Teams: An Experimental Study," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse13_2004, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Raab, Philippe & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2007. "Cournot Competition between Teams: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 06-26, University of California at Davis, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
8. Jordi Brandts & David J. Cooper & Enrique Fatas, 2006. "Leadership and Overcoming Coordination Failure with Asymmetric Costs," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 691.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Jordi Brandts & David Cooper & Enrique Fatas, 2007. "Leadership and overcoming coordination failure with asymmetric costs," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 269-284, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Francesco Feri & Bernd Irlenbusch & Matthias Sutter, 2008. "Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination – Large-Scale Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 2008-22, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Francesco Feri & Bernd Irlenbusch & Matthias Sutter, 2009. "Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination – Large-Scale Experimental Evidence," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_14, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
   • Feri, Francesco & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Sutter, Matthias, 2008. "Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination: Large-Scale Experimental Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 3741, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
10. Gary Bornstein, 2002. "Intergroup conflict: Individual, group and collective interests," Discussion Paper Series dp297, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
11. Giovanna Devetag, 2003. "Coordination and Information in Critical Mass Games: An Experimental Study," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 53-73, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Maria Giovanna Devetag, 2002. "Coordination and information in critical mass games: an experimental study," CEEL Working Papers 0214, Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia. [Downloadable!]
12. Thomas Chesney & Swee-Hoon Chuah & Robert Hoffmann, 2007. "Virtual world experimentation: An exploratory study," Discussion Papers 2007-14, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
13. Myung, Noah, . "Improving coordination and cooperation through competition," Working Papers 1305, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
14. Thomas Riechmann, 2005. "Dynamic Behavior in Minimum Effort Coordination Games - Some Theory of Group Size and Inter-Group Competition as Coordination Devices," Game Theory and Information 0503010, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
15. Giovanna Devetag & Andreas Ortmann, 2007. "When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 331-344, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Giovanna Devetag & Andreas Ortmann, 2006. "When and Why? A Critical Survey on Coordination Failure in the Laboratory," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp302, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague. [Downloadable!]
    • Giovanna Devetag & Andreas Ortmann, 2006. "When and Why? A Critical Survey on Coordination Failure in the Laboratory," CEEL Working Papers 0605, Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia. [Downloadable!]
16. Gary Charness & Matthew Jackson, 2006. "Group Play in Games and the Role of Consent in Network Formation," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 06-06, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Matthew Jackson & Gary Charness, 2004. "Group Play in Games and the Role of Consent in Network Formation," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 654, Econometric Society.
    • Charness, Gary & Jackson, Matthew O., 2004. "Group Play in Games and the Role of Consent in Network Formation," Working Papers 1193, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    • Gary Charness & Matthew O. Jackson, 2004. "Group Play in Games and the Role of Consent in Network Formation," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000213, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Charness, Gary & Jackson, Matthew O., 2007. "Group play in games and the role of consent in network formation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 417-445, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. John Hamman & Scott Rick & Roberto Weber, 2007. "Solving coordination failure with “all-or-none” group-level incentives," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 285-303, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Enrique Fatas & Tibor Neugebauer & Javier Perote, 2005. "Within-Team Competition in the Minimum Effort Coordination Game," Experimental 0503006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Enrique Fatas & Tibor Neugebauer & Javier Perote, 2006. "Within-Team Competition In The Minimum Effort Coordination Game," Pacific Economic Review, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(2), pages 247-266, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)