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Dynamic Behavior in Minimum Effort Coordination Games - Some Theory of Group Size and Inter-Group Competition as Coordination Devices Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Thomas Riechmann (University of Magdeburg)
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This paper presents a model of individual behavior in minimum effort coordination games, focusing primarily on the effects of the number of players and the introduction of inter-group competition. It is shown that independent of the number of players and the number of competing groups, the most inefficient equilibrium is always the stochastically stable one. Yet, it turns out that the `security' of more efficient equilibria increases with a decrease of the number of players and with an increase of the number of competing groups.
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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number
0503010.
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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 30 Mar 2005Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0503010Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 35Contact details of provider: Web page: http://129.3.20.41
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Keywords: Minimum Effort Coordination Group Competition Stochastic Stability Dynamic Games Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Bornstein, Gary & Gneezy, Uri & Nagel, Rosmarie, 2002.
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Cooper, R. & Dejong, D.V. & Forsythe, R. & Ross, T.W., 1989.
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Other versions: Christiane Clemens & Thomas Riechmann, 2003.
"Relative Payoffs and Evolutionary Spite --- Evolutionary Equilibria in Games with Finitely Many Players ,"
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98, Society for Computational Economics.
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Econometrica ,
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Cooper, Russell & John, Andrew, 1988.
"Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
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Bryant, John, 1983.
"A Simple Rational Expectations Keynes-Type Model ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
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Cachon, Gerard P & Camerer, Colin F, 1996.
"Loss-Avoidance and Forward Induction in Experimental Coordination Games ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
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Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin, 1998.
"Time horizon and equilibrium selection in tacit coordination games: Experimental results ,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ,
Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 231-248, October.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A., 2005.
"An experimental study of costly coordination ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 349-364, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
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