Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Behavioral Spillovers in Coordination Games

Contents:

Author Info

  • Timothy N. Cason

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Krannert School of Management, Purdue University)

  • Anya C. Savikhin

    (Becker Friedman Institute for Economic Research, The University of Chicago)

  • Roman Sheremeta

    (Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University)

Abstract

Motivated by problems of coordination failure observed in weak-link games, we experimentally investigate behavioral spillovers for minimum- and median-effort coordination games. Subjects play these coordination games simultaneously and sequentially. The results show that successful coordination on the Pareto optimal equilibrium in the median game influences behavior in the minimum game when the games are played sequentially. Moreover, this positive, Pareto-improving spillover is present even when group composition changes across games, although the effect is not as strong. We also find that the precedent for uncooperative behavior in the minimum game does not influence play in the median game. These findings suggest guidelines for increasing cooperative behavior within organizations.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.chapman.edu/ESI/wp/Sheremeta-Behavioral-Spillover.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Chapman University, Economic Science Institute in its series Working Papers with number 11-20.

as in new window
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:chu:wpaper:11-20

Contact details of provider:
Postal: One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866
Phone: (714) 628-2830
Fax: (714) 628-2881
Email:
Web page: http://www.chapman.edu/esi/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: coordination; order-statistic games; experiments; cooperation; minimum game; median game; behavioral spillover;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Max Albert & Werner Güth & Erich Kirchler & Boris Maciejovsky, 2002. "Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people? - An Experimental Analysis," Papers on Strategic Interaction, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group 2002-15, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  2. John Duffy & Jack Ochs, 2004. "Cooperative Behavior and the Frequency of Social Interaction," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000108, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Anya Savikhin & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2010. "Simultaneous Decision-Making in Competitive and Cooperative Environments," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute 10-09, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  4. Weber, Roberto & Camerer, Colin F. & Knez, Marc, 1996. "The Illusion of Leadership," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 992, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  5. Timothy N. Cason & Roman M. Sheremeta & Jingjing Zhang, 2010. "Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games," IEW - Working Papers 505, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich, revised Feb 2012.
  6. Samuelson, Larry, 2001. "Analogies, Adaptation, and Anomalies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 320-366, April.
  7. Huck, Steffen & Jehiel, Philippe & Rutter, Tom, 2011. "Feedback spillover and analogy-based expectations: A multi-game experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 351-365, March.
  8. Cherry, Todd L. & Crocker, Thomas D. & Shogren, Jason F., 2003. "Rationality spillovers," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 63-84, January.
  9. Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin, 2001. "Coordination and information: recent experimental evidence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 73(3), pages 345-351, December.
  10. Van Huyck, John B & Battalio, Raymond C & Beil, Richard O, 1991. "Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 106(3), pages 885-910, August.
  11. Berninghaus, Siegfried K. & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin, 1998. "Time horizon and equilibrium selection in tacit coordination games: Experimental results," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 231-248, October.
  12. David Cooper & John Kagel, 2008. "Learning and transfer in signaling games," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 415-439, March.
  13. Steiner, Jakub & Stewart, Colin, 2008. "Contagion through learning," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 3(4), December.
  14. J. B. Van Huyck & R. C. Battalio & R. O. Beil, 2010. "Tacit coordination games, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000393, David K. Levine.
  15. Cherry, Todd L. & Shogren, Jason F., 2007. "Rationality crossovers," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 261-277, April.
  16. COOPER, R. & DEJONG, D.V. & FORSYTHE, R. & Tom Ross, 1989. "Communication In Coordination Games," Carleton Industrial Organization Research Unit (CIORU), Carleton University, Department of Economics 89-07, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
  17. Cary Deck & Nikos Nikiforakis, 2010. "Perfect and Imperfect Real-Time Monitoring in a Minimum-Effort Game," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute 10-18, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  18. Gary Bornstein & Uri Gneezy & Rosemarie Nagel, 1999. "The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study," Economics Working Papers 393, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
  19. Knez, Marc & Camerer, Colin, 2000. "Increasing Cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemmas by Establishing a Precedent of Efficiency in Coordination Games," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 194-216, July.
  20. Max Albert & Werner Güth & Erich Kirchler & Boris Maciejovsky, 2007. "Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people?—An experimental analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 53-69, March.
  21. Roman Sheremeta, 2010. "Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests between Groups," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute 10-25, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  22. Jordi Brandts & David J. Cooper, 2006. "A Change Would Do You Good .... An Experimental Study on How to Overcome Coordination Failure in Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 669-693, June.
  23. Russell Cooper & Thomas W. Ross, 1985. "Product Warranties and Double Moral Hazard," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 103-113, Spring.
  24. Roberto Weber & Colin Camerer & Marc Knez, 2004. "Timing and Virtual Observability in Ultimatum Bargaining and “Weak Link†Coordination Games," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 25-48, February.
  25. Nikos Nikiforakis, 2010. "Experimental Economics," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 43(3), pages 337-345.
  26. Blume, Andreas & Ortmann, Andreas, 2007. "The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 274-290, January.
  27. Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 2002. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1644-1655, December.
  28. Clark, Kenneth & Sefton, Martin, 2001. "Repetition and signalling: experimental evidence from games with efficient equilibria," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 357-362, March.
  29. Cooper, Russell, et al, 1992. "Communication in Coordination Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 107(2), pages 739-71, May.
  30. P. Diamond, 1980. "Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium," Working papers 268, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  31. Ahn, T K, et al, 2001. " Cooperation in PD Games: Fear, Greed, and History of Play," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 106(1-2), pages 137-55, January.
  32. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
  33. Bryant, John, 1983. "A Simple Rational Expectations Keynes-Type Model," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 525-28, August.
  34. Page, Scott E., 2006. "Path Dependence," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 1(1), pages 87-115, January.
  35. Binmore, Ken & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "The evolution of focal points," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 21-42, April.
  36. Devetag, Giovanna, 2005. "Precedent transfer in coordination games: An experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 227-232, November.
  37. Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, 1988. "Multiple Expectational Equilibria under Monopolistic Competition," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 103(4), pages 695-713, November.
  38. Katz, Michael L & Shapiro, Carl, 1985. "Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 424-40, June.
  39. Jordi Brandts & David J. Cooper, 2007. "It's What You Say, Not What You Pay: An Experimental Study of Manager–Employee Relationships in Overcoming Coordination Failure," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 5(6), pages 1223-1268, December.
  40. Roberto A. Weber, 2006. "Managing Growth to Achieve Efficient Coordination in Large Groups," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 114-126, March.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Antonio FILIPPIN & Paolo CROSETTO, 2014. "A Reconsideration of Gender Differences in Risk Attitudes," Departmental Working Papers, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano 2014-01, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
  2. Cason, Timothy N. & Sheremeta, Roman M. & Zhang, Jingjing, 2012. "Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 26-43.
  3. Anya Savikhin & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2010. "Simultaneous Decision-Making in Competitive and Cooperative Environments," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute 10-09, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  4. McCarter, Matthew & Samek, Anya & Sheremeta, Roman, 2014. "Divided Loyalists or Conditional Cooperators? Creating Consensus about Cooperation in Multiple Simultaneous Social Dilemmas," MPRA Paper 58120, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Roman M. Sheremeta & Matthew W. McCarter, 2013. "You Can’t Put Old Wine in New Bottles: The Effect of Newcomers on Coordination in Groups," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute 13-02, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  6. Godoy, Sara & Morales, Antonio J. & Rodero, Javier, 2013. "Competition lessens competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 120(3), pages 419-423.
  7. Julian Romero, 2011. "The Effect of Hysteresis on Equilibrium Selection in Coordination Games," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1265, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  8. Matthew W. McCarter & Anya C. Samak & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2013. "Divided Loyalties or Conditional Cooperation? An experimental study of contributions to multiple public goods," Working Papers, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute 13-08, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  9. Bruttel, Lisa & Friehe, Tim, 2014. "On the path dependence of tax compliance," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 90-107.
  10. Holger Herz & Dmitry Taubinsky, 2013. "Market experience is a reference point in judgments of fairness," ECON - Working Papers, Department of Economics - University of Zurich 128, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:chu:wpaper:11-20. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Megan Luetje).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.