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The Effect of Intergroup Competition on Group Coordination: An Experimental Study

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Author Info
Gary Bornstein
Uri Gneezy
Rosemarie Nagel ()

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Abstract

We report an experiment on the effect of intergroup competition on group coordination in the minimal-effort game (Van Huyck et al., 1990). The competition was between two 7-person groups. Each player in each group independently chose an integer from 1 to 7. The group with the higher minimum won the competition and each of its members was paid according to the game’s original payoff matrix. Members of the losing group were paid nothing. In case of a tie, each player was paid half the payoff in the original matrix. This treatment was contrasted with two control treatments where each of the two groups played an independent coordination game, either with or without information about the minimum chosen by the outgroup. Although the intergroup competition does not change the set of strict equilibria, we found that it improved collective rationality by moving group members in the direction of higher-payoff equilibria. Merely providing group members with information about the minimal-effort level in the other group was not sufficient to generate this effect.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra in its series Economics Working Papers with number 393.

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Date of creation: May 1999
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Handle: RePEc:upf:upfgen:393

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Web page: http://www.econ.upf.edu/

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Related research
Keywords: Non cooperative games; coordination; minimum effort game; intergroup competition; Leex;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior

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  1. Nalbantian, Haig R & Schotter, Andrew, 1997. "Productivity under Group Incentives: An Experimental Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 314-41, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Cooper, Russell, et al, 1990. "Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 218-33, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. COOPER, R. & DEJONG, D.V. & FORSYTHE, R. & Tom Ross, 1989. "Communication In Coordination Games," Carleton Industrial Organization Research Unit (CIORU) 89-07, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Giovanna Devetag, 2000. "Transfer, Focality and Coordination: Some Experimental Results," LEM Papers Series 2000/02, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  2. Rosemarie Nagel, 2001. "Comment," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 61, pages 03, Janvier-M. [Downloadable!]
  3. Stefania Bortolotti & Giovanna Devetag & Andreas Ortmann, 2009. "Exploring the effects of real effort in a weak-link experiment," CEEL Working Papers 0901, Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia. [Downloadable!]
  4. Roberto A. Weber, 2006. "Managing Growth to Achieve Efficient Coordination in Large Groups," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 114-126, March. [Downloadable!]
  5. Giovanna Devetag, 2000. "Coordination in "Critical Mass" Games: An Experimental Study," LEM Papers Series 2000/03, Laboratory of Economics and Management (LEM), Sant'Anna School of Advanced Studies, Pisa, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  6. Quazi Shahriar & Subhasish Dugar, 2009. "Focal Points and Economic Efficiency: Role of Relative Label Salience," Working Papers 0033, San Diego State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Philippe Raab & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2004. "Cournot Competition between Teams: An Experimental Study," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse13_2004, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Jordi Brandts & David J. Cooper & Enrique Fatas, 2006. "Leadership and Overcoming Coordination Failure with Asymmetric Costs," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 691.07, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Francesco Feri & Bernd Irlenbusch & Matthias Sutter, 2008. "Efficiency Gains from Team-Based Coordination – Large-Scale Experimental Evidence," Working Papers 2008-22, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Gary Bornstein, 2002. "Intergroup conflict: Individual, group and collective interests," Discussion Paper Series dp297, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. [Downloadable!]
  11. Giovanna Devetag, 2003. "Coordination and Information in Critical Mass Games: An Experimental Study," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 53-73, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Thomas Chesney & Swee-Hoon Chuah & Robert Hoffmann, 2007. "Virtual world experimentation: An exploratory study," Discussion Papers 2007-14, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
  13. Myung, Noah, . "Improving coordination and cooperation through competition," Working Papers 1305, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  14. Thomas Riechmann, 2005. "Dynamic Behavior in Minimum Effort Coordination Games - Some Theory of Group Size and Inter-Group Competition as Coordination Devices," Game Theory and Information 0503010, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  15. Giovanna Devetag & Andreas Ortmann, 2007. "When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 331-344, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Gary Charness & Matthew Jackson, 2006. "Group Play in Games and the Role of Consent in Network Formation," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 06-06, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. John Hamman & Scott Rick & Roberto Weber, 2007. "Solving coordination failure with “all-or-none” group-level incentives," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 285-303, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Enrique Fatas & Tibor Neugebauer & Javier Perote, 2005. "Within-Team Competition in the Minimum Effort Coordination Game," Experimental 0503006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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