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Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests between Groups

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  • Sheremeta, Roman

Abstract

This experiment investigates contests between groups. Each group has one strong player, with a higher valuation for the prize, and two weak players, with lower valuations. In contests where individual efforts are perfect substitutes, all players expend significantly higher efforts than predicted by theory. In best-shot contests, where group performance depends on the best performer, most of the effort is expended by strong players while weak players free-ride. In weakest-link contests, where group performance depends on the worst performer, there is almost no free-riding and all players expend similar positive efforts conforming to the group Pareto dominant equilibrium.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 52105.

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Date of creation: 2011
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:52105

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Keywords: contest; between-group competition; within-group competition; asymmetry; coordination; free-riding; experiments;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Cason, Timothy N. & Savikhin, Anya C. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2012. "Behavioral spillovers in coordination games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 233-245.
  2. Sheremeta, Roman & Zhang, Jingjing, 2009. "Can Groups Solve the Problem of Over-Bidding in Contests?," MPRA Paper 49885, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Eisenkopf, Gerald, 2014. "The impact of management incentives in intergroup contests," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 42-61.
  4. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Dongryul Lee & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2011. "Top Guns May Not Fire: Best-Shot Group Contests with Group-Specific Public Good Prizes," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. 024, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  5. Linardi, Sera & Tanaka, Tomomi, 2013. "Competition as a savings incentive: A field experiment at a homeless shelter," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 240-251.
  6. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Iryna Topolyan, 2013. "The Attack-and-Defence Group Contests," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK. 049, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
  7. Cason, Timothy N. & Sheremeta, Roman M. & Zhang, Jingjing, 2012. "Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 26-43.
  8. Sheremeta, Roman, 2009. "Contest Design: An Experimental Investigation," MPRA Paper 52101, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Gerald Eisenkopf, 2013. "The Impact of Management Incentives in Intergroup Contests," TWI Research Paper Series 87, Thurgauer Wirtschaftsinstitut, Universität Konstanz.
  10. Todd Cherry & Stephen Cotten & Stephan Kroll, 2013. "Heterogeneity, Coordination and the Provision of Best-Shot Public Goods," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 497-510, December.
  11. Gerald Eisenkopf, 2013. "The Impact of Management Incentives in Intergroup Contests," Working Paper Series of the Department of Economics, University of Konstanz 2013-26, Department of Economics, University of Konstanz.
  12. Philip Brookins & John Lightle & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2014. "An experimental study of sorting in group contests," Working Papers, Department of Economics, Florida State University wp2014_01_01, Department of Economics, Florida State University.

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