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Simultaneous Decision-Making in Competitive and Cooperative Environments

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Author Info

  • Anya Savikhin

    () (The University of Chicago)

  • Roman M. Sheremeta

    () (Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University)

Abstract

MWe experimentally investigate simultaneous decision-making in two contrasting environments: a competitive environment (a contest) and a cooperative environment (a voluntary contribution mechanism). We find that the cooperative nature of the voluntary contribution mechanism spills over to the contest, decreasing sub-optimal overbidding in the contest. However, contributions to the public good are not affected by simultaneous participation in the contest. There is a significant negative correlation between decisions made in competitive and cooperative environments, i.e. more cooperative subjects tend to be less competitive and vice versa. This correlation can be rationalized by heterogeneous social preferences towards inequality but not by bounded rationality theory.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Chapman University, Economic Science Institute in its series Working Papers with number 10-09.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:chu:wpaper:10-09

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Related research

Keywords: cooperation; competition; public goods; contests; experiments; behavioral spillover;

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Cited by:
  1. Chen, Chia-Ching & Chiu, I-Ming & Smith, John & Yamada, Tetsuji, 2012. "Too smart to be selfish? Measures of cognitive ability, social preferences, and consistency," MPRA Paper 41078, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Cason, Timothy N. & Savikhin, Anya C. & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2012. "Behavioral spillovers in coordination games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 233-245.
  3. Duffy, Sean & Smith, John, 2012. "Cognitive load in the multi-player prisoner's dilemma game," MPRA Paper 35906, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Roman M. Sheremeta, 2013. "Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments," Working Papers 13-06, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  5. Mago, Shakun & Sheremeta, Roman & Yates, Andrew, 2012. "Best-of-Three Contest Experiments: Strategic versus Psychological Momentum," MPRA Paper 43031, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Curtis R. Price & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2012. "Endowment Origin, Demographic Effects and Individual Preferences in Contests," Working Papers 12-07, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
  7. Duffy, Sean & Smith, John, 2012. "Cognitive load in the multi-player prisoner's dilemma game: Are there brains in games?," MPRA Paper 38825, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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