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Effort levels in contests : The public-good prize case

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  • Baik, Kyung Hwan
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

    Volume (Year): 41 (1993)
    Issue (Month): 4 ()
    Pages: 363-367

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:41:y:1993:i:4:p:363-367

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

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    Cited by:
    1. Katz, Eliakim & Tokatlidu, Julia, 1996. "Group competition for rents," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 599-607, December.
    2. Dijkstra, Bouwe R., 1998. "Cooperation by way of support in a rent seeking contest for a public good," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 703-725, November.
    3. S. Keith Berry, 2006. "Firm Incentives for Invention Prizes with Multiple Winners," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 32(1), pages 83-95, Winter.
    4. Nti, Kofi O., 1998. "Effort and performance in group contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 769-781, November.
    5. Hurley, Terrance M. & Shogren, Jason F., 1997. "Environmental Conflicts and the SLAPP," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 253-273, July.
    6. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Iryna Topolyan, 2013. "The Attack-and-Defence Group Contests," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 049, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    7. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Dongryul Lee & Roman M. Sheremeta, 2013. "Top Guns May Not Fire: Best-Shot Group Contests with Group-Specific Public Good Prizes," Working Papers 13-12, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    8. Sheremeta, Roman, 2011. "Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests between Groups," MPRA Paper 52105, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu & Na, Sunghyun, 2001. "Bidding for a group-specific public-good prize," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 415-429, December.
    10. Subhasish M. Chowdhury & Dongryul Lee & Iryna Topolyan, 2013. "The Max-Min Group Contest," University of East Anglia Applied and Financial Economics Working Paper Series 050, School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK..
    11. Kyung Baik, 2008. "Contests with group-specific public-good prizes," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(1), pages 103-117, January.
    12. Gil Epstein & Yosef Mealem, 2009. "Group specific public goods, orchestration of interest groups with free riding," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(3), pages 357-369, June.
    13. Wolfgang Leininger, 2002. "Contests over Public Goods: Evolutionary Stability and the Free-Rider Problem," CESifo Working Paper Series 713, CESifo Group Munich.
    14. Ian A. MacKenzie, 2009. "Controlling externalities in the presence of rent seeking," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 09/111, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
    15. ALBOTH, Dirk & LERNER, Anat & SHALEV, Jonathan, 1997. "Auctioning public goods to groups of aghents," CORE Discussion Papers 1997077, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    16. Sheremeta, Roman, 2009. "Essays on Experimental Investigation of Lottery Contests," MPRA Paper 49888, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Lim, Byung In & Shogren, Jason F., 2005. "Valuation by conflict," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 251-261, November.
    18. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu, 1997. "Delegation in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 281-298, May.
    19. Lee, Dongryul, 2012. "Weakest-link contests with group-specific public good prizes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 238-248.

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