A General Model of Rent Seeking for Public Goods
AbstractThis paper generalizes the model of collective rent-seeking over a public good. Expanding the rent seeker's consumption bundle to include preferences over the public good and a private good, our results suggest collective rent-seeking is positively related to group size. Although free riding exists within a group, there is not a one-for-one tradeoff. In addition, rent seeking increases with wealth. Finally, total effort expended by both groups increases if either group increases in membership size, except in the case of an extremely lopsided contest. The key condition underlying these results is that the marginal utility of the public good is not inversely related to the private good. Copyright 1995 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Iowa State University, Department of Economics in its series Staff General Research Papers with number 5229.
Date of creation: 01 Jan 1995
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Public Choice 1995, vol. 83
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Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070
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- Riaz, Khalid & Shogren, Jason F. & Johnson, Stanley R., 1995. "A General Model of Rent Seeking for Public Goods," Staff General Research Papers, Iowa State University, Department of Economics 861, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
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