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Sleep restriction increases coordination failure

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  • Castillo, Marco
  • Dickinson, David L.

Abstract

When group outcomes depend on minimal effort (e.g., disease containment, work teams, or group hunt success), a classic coordination problem exists. Using a well- established paradigm, we examine how a common cognitive state (insufficient sleep) impacts coordination outcomes. Our data indicate that insufficient sleep increases coordination failure costs, which suggests that the sleep or, more generally, cognitive composition of a group might determine its ability to escape from a trap of costly miscoordination and wasted cooperative efforts. These findings are first evidence of the potentially large externality of a commonly experienced biological state (insufficient sleep) that has infiltrated many societies.

Suggested Citation

  • Castillo, Marco & Dickinson, David L., 2022. "Sleep restriction increases coordination failure," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 200(C), pages 358-370.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:200:y:2022:i:c:p:358-370
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2022.06.001
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    Cited by:

    1. David L. Dickinson, 2020. "Deliberation Enhances the Confirmation Bias in Politics," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(4), pages 1-25, November.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making

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