Classification of Two-Person Ordinal Bimatrix Games
AbstractThe set of possible outcomes of a strongly ordinal bimatrix game is studied by imbedding each pair of possible payoffs as a point on the standard two-dimensional integral lattice. In particular, we count the number of different Pareto optimal sets of each cardinality; we establish asymptotic bounds for the number of different convex hulls of the point sets, for the average shape of the set of points dominated by the Pareto optimal set, and for the average shape of the convex hull of the point set. We also indicate the effect of individual rationality considerations on our results. As most of our results are asymptotic, the appendix includes a careful examination of the important case of 2 x 2 games.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 996.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Oct 1991
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in International Journal of Game Theory (1992), 21(3): 267-290
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Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Other versions of this item:
- Barany, I & Lee, J & Shubik, M, 1992. "Classification of Two-Person Ordinal Bimatrix Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 267-90.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
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- Stanford, William, 2004. "Individually rational pure strategies in large games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 221-233, April.
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