This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Classification of Two-Person Ordinal Bimatrix Games

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Imre Barany
J. Lee
Martin Shubik () (Cowles Foundation, Yale University)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

The set of possible outcomes of a strongly ordinal bimatrix game is studied by imbedding each pair of possible payoffs as a point on the standard two-dimensional integral lattice. In particular, we count the number of different Pareto optimal sets of each cardinality; we establish asymptotic bounds for the number of different convex hulls of the point sets, for the average shape of the set of points dominated by the Pareto optimal set, and for the average shape of the convex hull of the point set. We also indicate the effect of individual rationality considerations on our results. As most of our results are asymptotic, the appendix includes a careful examination of the important case of 2 x 2 games.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d09b/d0996.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Cowles Foundation, Yale University in its series Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers with number 996.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: Oct 1991
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cwl:cwldpp:996

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA
Phone: (203) 432-3702
Fax: (203) 432-6167
Web page: http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Postal: Cowles Foundation, Yale University, Box 208281, New Haven, CT 06520-8281 USA

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Glena Ames).

Related research
Keywords: Game theory; rationality; preferences;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Thomas Quint & Martin Shubik & Dickey Yan, 1995. "Dumb Bugs and Bright Noncooperative Players: Games, Context and Behavior," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1094, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  2. Thomas Quint & Martin Shubik, 1994. "On the Number of Nash Equilibria in a Bimatrix Game," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1089, Cowles Foundation, Yale University. [Downloadable!]
  3. Fabrizio Germano, 2006. "On some geometry and equivalence classes of normal form games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(4), pages 561-581, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? There are over 21000 authors registered on RePEc Author Service.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-10.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.