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• Alberto Alesina

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 75 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 1-20
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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:75:y:2000:i:1:p:1-20

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1. Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2003. "A Spatial Voting Model Where Proportional Rule Leads to Two-Party Equilibria," CEIS Research Paper 31, Tor Vergata University, CEIS. [Downloadable!]
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   • DE SINOPOLI, Francesco & IANNANTUONI, Giovanna & ,, 2000. "A spatial voting model where proportional rule leads to two-party equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers 2000037, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
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2. Jordan Rappaport, 1997. "Extremist Funding, Centrist Voters, and Candidate Divergence," Research in Economics 97-06-059e, Santa Fe Institute. [Downloadable!]
3. Amihai Glazer & Mark Gradstein, 2005. "Elections with contribution-maximizing candidates," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 467-482, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Alberto F. Alesina & Richard T. Holden, 2008. "Ambiguity and Extremism in Elections," NBER Working Papers 14143, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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5. Humberto Llavador, 2001. "Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention," Economics Working Papers 571, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Oct 2004. [Downloadable!]
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   • Humberto Llavador, 2006. "Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 55-81, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Kohei Kawamura, 2008. "Inequality, Happiness and Relative Concerns: What Actually is their Relationship?," ESE Discussion Papers 182, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
7. Maurice Kugler & Howard Rosental, 2000. "Checks and Balances: an assessment of the institutional separtion of political powers in Colombia," WORKING PAPERS SERIES. DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO 002117, FEDESARROLLO. [Downloadable!]
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   • Kugler, M. & Rosenthal, H., 2000. "Checks and Balances: An Assessment of the Institutional Separation of Political Powers in Colombia," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0018, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.

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