Standard models of soft budget constraints consider bailouts as pure monetary transfers. However, in practice often additional obligations or restrictions, such as savings goals, are linked to monetary bailouts. This paper analyzes in a model of a federation if such restrictions change eco- nomic outcomes in an soft budget constraint environment and under what circumstances they can increase welfare as compared to pure soft budget and hard budget regimes. We ?nd that restrictions generally harden budget constraints, but not necessarily increase welfare. The evaluation crucially depends on the tax endowment of the central government and on the shape of preferences.
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Paper provided by Bavarian Graduate Program in Economics (BGPE) in its series Working Papers with number
062.
Find related papers by JEL classification: H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism H74 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Borrowing H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management