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Size and Soft Budget Constraints

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Author Info

  • Ernesto Crivelli

    ()
    (University of Bonn, BGSE, Lennestr. 43, Bonn, Germany, 53113)

  • Klaas Staal

    (University of Bonn, IIW, Lennestr. 37, Bonn, Germany, 53113)

Abstract

There is much evidence against the so-called "too big to fail" hypothesis in the case of bailouts to sub-national governments. We look at a model where districts of di_erent size provide local public goods with positive spillovers. Matching grants of a central government can induce socially-e_cient provision, but districts can still exploit the intervening central government by inducing direct _nancing. We show that the ability of a district to induce a bailout from the central government and district size are negatively correlated.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations in its series Working Papers with number 2006-13.

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Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ifr:wpaper:2006-13

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Keywords: bailouts; soft-budget constraints; jurisdictional size; public goods; spillovers;

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References

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  1. Sanguinetti, Pablo & Tommasi, Mariano, 2004. "Intergovernmental transfers and fiscal behavior insurance versus aggregate discipline," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 149-170, January.
  2. Alesina, Alberto & Spolaore, Enrico, 1997. "On the Number and Size of Nations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1027-56, November.
  3. Wildasin, David E., 1997. "Externalities and bailouts : hard and soft budget constraints in intergovernmental fiscal relations," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1843, The World Bank.
  4. Pettersson-Lidbom, Per & Dahlberg, Matz, 2003. "An Empirical Approach for Evaluating Soft Budget Constraints," Working Paper Series 2003:28, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  5. Seitz, Helmut, 1999. "Subnational government bailouts in Germany," ZEI Working Papers B 20-1999, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn.
  6. Massimo Bordignon, 2000. "Problems of Soft Budget Constraints in Intergovernmental Relationships: The Case of Italy," Research Department Publications 3099, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  7. Qian, Yingyi & Roland, Gerard, 1998. "Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1143-62, December.
  8. Kornai, Janos, 1986. "The Soft Budget Constraint," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(1), pages 3-30.
  9. Eric S. Maskin, 1999. "Recent Theoretical Work on the Soft Budget Constraint," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(2), pages 421-425, May.
  10. Juan Pablo Nicolini & Josefina Posadas & Juan Sanguinetti & Pablo Sanguinetti & Mariano Tommasi, 2002. "Decentralization, Fiscal Discipline in Sub-National Governments and the Bailout Problem: The Case of Argentina," Research Department Publications 3160, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  11. Inman, Robert P, 1995. "How to Have a Fiscal Crisis: Lessons from Philadelphia," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(2), pages 378-83, May.
  12. Jürgen Von Hagen & Massimo Bordignon & Bhajan S. Grewal & Per Peterson & Helmut Seitz & Matz Dahlberg, 2000. "Subnational Government Bailouts in OECD Countries: Four Case Studies," Research Department Publications 3100, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Ernesto Crivelli, 2012. "Local Governments’ Fiscal Balance, Privatization, and Banking Sector Reform in Transition Countries," IMF Working Papers 12/146, International Monetary Fund.
  2. Serhan Cevik, 2011. "Policy Coordination in Fiscal Federalism," IMF Working Papers 11/147, International Monetary Fund.
  3. Levaggi, Rosella, 2010. "From local to global public goods: How should externalities be represented?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 1040-1042, September.
  4. Hikaru Ogawa & David E. Wildasin, 2007. "Think Locally, Act Locally: Spillovers, Spillbacks, and Efficient Decentralized Policymaking," CESifo Working Paper Series 2142, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. David Wildasin, 2007. "Pre-Emption: Federal Statutory Intervention in State Taxation," Working Papers 2007-05, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations.
  6. Christos Kotsogiannis & Robert Schwager, 2006. "Fiscal Equalization and Yardstick Competition," Working Papers 2006-15, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations.
  7. Dufrénot, G. & Frouté, P. & Schalck, C., 2010. "The French Regions’ Borrowing Behaviours. How heterogeneous are they?," Working papers 289, Banque de France.

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