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Regional Grants as Pork Barrel Politics

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  • Kevin Milligan
  • Michael Smart

Abstract

We investigate the political and economic factors influencing the allocation of regional development grants for a panel of Canadian electoral districts in the 1988-2001 period. In a strong party system such as Canada’s, models of political competition predict little role for individual legislators, as party leaders allocate resources to maximize party success. While spending is targeted toward some “swing” districts, we do also find it is higher in districts represented by members of the government party, especially those in the federal Cabinet, and those of lower seniority. We develop a model featuring bargaining over legislative and non-legislative favours that is consistent with the evidence.

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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1453.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1453

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References

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  1. Persson, T. & Roland, G. & Tabellini, G., 1997. "Comparative Politics and Public Finance," Papers, Stockholm - International Economic Studies 633, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  2. Eric Crampton, 2002. "Distributive Politics in a Strong Party System: Evidence from Canadian Job Grant Programs," Microeconomics, EconWPA 0211001, EconWPA.
  3. Christopher F Baum & Mark E. Schaffer & Steven Stillman, 2003. "Instrumental variables and GMM: Estimation and testing," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, StataCorp LP, vol. 3(1), pages 1-31, March.
  4. Wiji Arulampalam & Sugato Dasgupta & Amrita Dhillon & Bhaskar Dutta, 2008. "Electoral goals and center-state transfers: A Theoretical model and empirical evidence from India," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India 08-14, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
  5. Dixit, Avinash K & Londregan, John, 1994. "Redistributive Politics and Economic Efficiency," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 1056, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Olivier Cadot & Lars-Hendrik Röller & Andreas Stephan, 2002. "Contribution to Productivity or Pork Barrel? The Two Faces of Infrastructure Investment," CIG Working Papers, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG) FS IV 02-09, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
  7. Assar Lindbeck & Jörgen Weibull, 1987. "Balanced-budget redistribution as the outcome of political competition," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 273-297, January.
  8. Dahlberg, Matz & Johansson, Eva, 1999. "On the Vote Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments," Working Paper Series, Uppsala University, Department of Economics 1999:24, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
  9. Douglas Staiger & James H. Stock, 1997. "Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 65(3), pages 557-586, May.
  10. David Strömberg, 2004. "Radio's Impact on Public Spending," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 119(1), pages 189-221, February.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Albert Solé-Ollé, 2009. "Inter-regional redistribution through infrastructure investment: tactical or programmatic?," Working Papers, Xarxa de Referència en Economia Aplicada (XREAP) XREAP2009-13, Xarxa de Referència en Economia Aplicada (XREAP), revised Nov 2009.
  2. Petra Ens, 2009. "Tax competition and equalization: the impact of voluntary cooperation on the efficiency goal," Working Papers 2009/16, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  3. Marcelin Joanis, 2009. "The Road to Power: Partisan Loyalty and the Centralized Provision of Local Infrastructure," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO 2009s-46, CIRANO.
  4. Sengupta, Bodhisattva, 2011. "Provision of public goods in a federal economy: The role of party politics," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 104-119, March.
  5. Martin Gonzalez-Eiras & Dirk Niepelt, 2004. "Sustaining Social Security," 2004 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 199, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  6. Valentino Larcinese & James M. Snyder, Jr. & Cecilia Testa, 2006. "Testing Models Of Distributive Politicsusing Exit Polls To Measure Voterpreferences And Partisanship," STICERD - Political Economy and Public Policy Paper Series, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE 19, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
  7. Chandler, Vincent, 2011. "The Canada economic action plan as electoral tool," MPRA Paper 33594, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Boadway, Robin & Tremblay, Jean-François, 2012. "Reassessment of the Tiebout model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 96(11), pages 1063-1078.
  9. Marco Portmann & David Stadelmann & Reiner Eichenberger, 2012. "District magnitude and representation of the majority’s preferences: Evidence from popular and parliamentary votes," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 585-610, June.
  10. Jan Werner & Laurent Guihéry & Ognjen Djukic, 2006. "Fiscal Federalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ten Years after the Dayton Treatment and Still not in a Steady Condition," Working Papers, Institute of Local Public Finance 01-2006, Institute of Local Public Finance.
  11. Davide Luca & Andrés Rodríguez-Pose, 2014. "Electoral politics and regional development. Assessing the geographical allocation of public investment in Turkey," Working Papers, Universidade de Vigo, GEN - Governance and Economics research Network 1402, Universidade de Vigo, GEN - Governance and Economics research Network.

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