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Does partisan alignment affect the electoral reward of intergovernmental transfers?

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Author Info
Albert Solé-Ollé () (Universitat de Barcelona (UB); Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB); CESifo)
Pilar Sorribas-Navarro () (Universitat Barcelona (UB); Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB))
Abstract

In this paper we test the hypothesis that intergovernmental grants allocated to co-partisans buy more political support than grants allocated to local governments controlled by opposition parties. We use a rich Spanish database containing information about the grants received by 617 municipalities during the period 1993-2003 from two different upper-tier governments (Regional and Upper-local), as well as data of municipal voting behaviour at three electoral contests held at the different layers of government during this period. Therefore, we are able to estimate two different vote equations, analysing the effects of grants given to aligned and unaligned municipalities on the vote share of the incumbent party/parties at the regional and local elections. We account for the endogeneity of grants by instrumenting them with the average amount of grants distributed by upper-layer governments. The results suggest that grants given to co-partisans buy some political support, but that grants given to opposition parties do not bring any votes, suggesting that the grantee reaps as much political credit from intergovernmental grants as the grantor

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Paper provided by Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB) in its series Working Papers with number 2008/2.

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Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2009/11/doc2008-2

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Related research
Keywords: Voting; parties; grants.;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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  1. Avinash Dixit & John Londregan, 1998. "Ideology, Tactics, And Efficiency In Redistributive Politics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(2), pages 497-529, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Grossman, Philip J, 1994. " A Political Theory of Intergovernmental Grants," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 78(3-4), pages 295-303, March.
  3. Castells, Antoni & Sole-Olle, Albert, 2005. "The regional allocation of infrastructure investment: The role of equity, efficiency and political factors," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(5), pages 1165-1205, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Albert Solé-Ollé, 2006. "The effects of party competition on budget outcomes: Empirical evidence from local governments in Spain," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 145-176, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Case, Anne, 2001. "Election goals and income redistribution: Recent evidence from Albania," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 405-423, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Levitt, Steven D & Snyder, James M, Jr, 1997. "The Impact of Federal Spending on House Election Outcomes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 30-53, February.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Giardina, Emilio & Cavalieri, Marina & Guccio, Calogero & Mazza, Isidoro, 2009. "Federalism, Party Competition and Budget Outcome: Empirical Findings on Regional Health Expenditure in Italy," MPRA Paper 16437, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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