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Partisan targeting of inter-governmental transfers & state interference in local elections: evidence from Spain

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Author Info

  • Marta Curto-Grau

    ()
    (Universitat de Barcelona & IEB)

  • Albert Solé-Ollé

    ()
    (Universitat de Barcelona & IEB)

  • Pilar Sorribas-Navarro

    ()
    (Universitat de Barcelona & IEB)

Abstract

We examine whether state-level incumbents discriminate in the allocation of transfers in favour of local governments controlled by co-partisans, and whether the electoral prospects of local incumbents improve when they are aligned with the state incumbent. Using a new database covering around 3,000 Spanish municipalities during the period 2000-07 and a Regression Discontinuity design, we document a very strong and robust effect: in close races, municipalities aligned with the regional government obtain on average 83% more per capita transfers and their incumbents gain 10% more votes at the local elections. We also show that the effect of alignment is stronger: (i) when regional and local elections are held on the same day, (ii) in regions with less competitive regional elections, and (ii) in regions with more budget resources.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB) in its series Working Papers with number 2012/31.

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Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2012/6/doc2012-31

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Keywords: Political parties; inter-governmental transfers; pork barrel politics;

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Jon H. Fiva & Olle Folke & Rune J. Sørensen, 2013. "The Power of Parties," CESifo Working Paper Series 4119, CESifo Group Munich.

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