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Bringing Home the Bacon: An empirical analysis of the extent and effects of pork-barreling in Australian politics

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  • Andrew Leigh

Abstract

Which electorates receive targeted funding, and does targeted funding swing votes? To answer these questions, I analyze four discretionary programs funded by the Australian federal government during the 2001-2004 election cycle. Controlling for relevant demographic characteristics of the electorate, those electorates held by the governing coalition received a larger share of discretionary funding, and a larger number of program grants. Among government seats, funding does not appear to have been directed towards those that were more marginal. More discretionary funding – particularly on road-building – was associated with a larger swing towards the government in the 2004 election.

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File URL: http://cbe.anu.edu.au/research/papers/ceprdpapers/DP580.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Centre for Economic Policy Research, Research School of Economics, Australian National University in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 580.

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Date of creation: May 2008
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Handle: RePEc:auu:dpaper:580

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Keywords: elections; local expenditure; voting; targeted funding; pork barreling;

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  1. Andrew Leigh, 2005. "Economic Voting And Electoral Behavior: How Do Individual, Local, And National Factors Affect The Partisan Choice?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17, pages 265-296, 07.
  2. Eric Crampton, 2002. "Distributive Politics in a Strong Party System: Evidence from Canadian Job Grant Programs," Microeconomics 0211001, EconWPA.
  3. Leigh, Andrew & Wolfers, Justin, 2006. "Competing Approaches to Forecasting Elections: Economic Models, Opinion Polling and Prediction Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 5555, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Alvarez, Michael R. & Saving, Jason, 1995. "Congressional Committees and the Political Economy of Federal Outlays," Working Papers 898, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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Cited by:
  1. Mikael Elinder & Henrik Jordahl & Panu Poutvaara, 2008. "Selfish and Prospective. Theory and Evidence of Pocketbook Voting," Discussion Papers 40, Aboa Centre for Economics.
  2. Firpo, Sergio & Ponczek, Vladimir & Sanfelice, Viviane, 2014. "The Relationship between Federal Budget Amendments and Local Electoral Power," IZA Discussion Papers 7918, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

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