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The Labor Market of Italian Politicians

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  • Massimiliano Landi

    (SMU)

  • Antonio Merlo
  • Vincenzo Galasso
  • Andrea Mattozzi

Abstract

Like voters (the represented), politicians (the representees) are the heart and soul of representative democracy. But isnt being a politician just like any other job? After we get past the rhetoric, is politics any different than other occupations? In the political sector, voters, parties and politicians represent the counterparts of consumers, firms and workers/managers in the market sector. In fact, the analogy is much deeper than it may appear at first sight. In the market sector, consumers determine to a large extent the success of a firm and ultimately the managements fate. However, managers are chosen by the firms, which typically have an objective that is different from those of consumers and managers. Likewise, while in all democratic systems the voters ultimately determine who is elected, it is typically the case that political parties nominate candidates for public office. Furthermore, the objectives of voters and parties with respect to the selection of candidates may differ, and are constrained by the career ambitions of individuals with political aspirations. But then, what really makes a career in the political sector different from a career in any other economic sector? There are at least three distinctive features that characterize the labor market in the political sector. First, politicians are typically under the spotlight, receiving the attention of the media and of a variety of citizens organizations. This makes politics a showcase, where politicians in office can display their political skills, while it might be more difficult for individuals working in the market sector to reveal their market ability. Second, inter-party competition for potential politicians is likely to be of secondary importance, as ideological preferences are more likely to attract individuals toward specific parties at the beginning of their political careers. Third, it is often the case that political parties take care of their losers by reserving partys positions to defeated incumbents. As a result, while individual careers within the political sector are inevitably linked to the opportunities available within parties, the extent to which individual endowments of political and market skills are correlated, or experience in the political (market) sector is also valuable in the market (political) sector, links the labor markets of the two sectors. This link affects the selection of politicians, the politicians careers, and the relationship between parties and voters.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by East Asian Bureau of Economic Research in its series Labor Economics Working Papers with number 22461.

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Date of creation: Jan 2008
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Handle: RePEc:eab:laborw:22461

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Keywords: voters; parties; political sector;

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References

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  1. Michael P. Keane & Antonio Merlo, 2007. "Money, Political Ambition, and the Career Decisions of Politicians," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania 07-016, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  2. Mattozzi, Andrea & Merlo, Antonio, 2007. "Political Careers or Career Politicians?," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 6164, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Messner, Matthias & Polborn, Mattias K., 2004. "Paying politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2423-2445, December.
  4. Stefano Gagliarducci & Tommaso Nannicini & Paolo Naticchioni, 2007. "Outside Income and Moral Hazard: The Elusive Quest for Good Politicians," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series, Boston University - Department of Economics dp-164, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  5. Daniel Diermeier & Michael Keane & Antonio Merlo, 2004. "A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers: Supplementary Materiel," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania 04-038, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
  6. Blundell,Richard & Newey,Whitney K. & Persson,Torsten (ed.), 2006. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521692083.
  7. Bartolini, S. & D'Alimonte, R., 1995. "Plurality Competition and Party realignment in Italy: The 1994 Parliamentary Elections," Papers, European Institute - Political and Social Sciences 95/7, European Institute - Political and Social Sciences.
  8. Blundell,Richard & Newey,Whitney K. & Persson,Torsten (ed.), 2006. "Advances in Economics and Econometrics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521871525.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. A. Fedele & P. Giannoccolo, 2013. "Moneycracy," Working Papers, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna wp893, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
  2. Fabio Padovano, 2013. "Are we witnessing a paradigm shift in the analysis of political competition?," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 631-651, September.
  3. Giovanni Prarolo & Carlotta Berti Ceroni & Giorgio Bellettini, 2012. "Knowing the right person in the right place: political connections and resistance to change," 2012 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 976, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  4. Drago, Francesco & Nannicini, Tommaso & Sobbrio, Francesco, 2013. "Meet the Press: How Voters and Politicians Respond to Newspaper Entry and Exit," IZA Discussion Papers, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) 7169, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  5. Galasso, Vincenzo & Nannicini, Tommaso, 2009. "Competing on Good Politicians," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 7363, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  6. Gagliarducci, Stefano & Nannicini, Tommaso & Naticchioni, Paolo, 2010. "Moonlighting politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 688-699, October.
  7. Thomas Braendle, 2013. "Do Institutions Affect Citizens' Selection into Politics?," Working papers, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel 2013/04, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
  8. Thomas Braendle & Alois Stutzer, 2010. "Political Selection of Public Servants and Parliamentary Oversight," Working papers, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel 2010/08, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
  9. Audinga Baltrunaite & Piera Bello & Alessandra Casarico & Paola Profeta, 2013. "Gender quotas and the quality of politicians," Working Papers, FEDEA 2013-11, FEDEA.
  10. Giorgio Bellettini & Carlotta Berti Ceroni & Giovanni Prarolo, 2009. "Political Persistence, Connections and Economic Growth," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich 2553, CESifo Group Munich.
  11. Thomas Braendle & Alois Stutzer, 2010. "Public servants in parliament: theory and evidence on its determinants in Germany," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 145(1), pages 223-252, October.
  12. Andrea Mattozzi & Antonio Merlo, 2011. "Mediocracy, Fourth Version," PIER Working Paper Archive, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania 13-010, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 08 Feb 2013.
  13. Giuseppe Bertola & Paolo Sestito, 2011. "A Comparative Perspective on Italy's Human Capital Accumulation," Quaderni di storia economica (Economic History Working Papers), Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area 06, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.

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