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Moonlighting politicians

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Author Info

  • Gagliarducci, Stefano
  • Nannicini, Tommaso
  • Naticchioni, Paolo

Abstract

In most modern democracies elected officials can work in the private sector while appointed in parliament. We show that when the political and market sectors are not mutually exclusive, a trade-off arises between the quality of elected officials and the time they devote to political life. If high-ability citizens can keep earning money outside of parliament, they will be more likely to run for election; for the same reason, they will also be more likely to shirk once elected. These predictions are confronted with a dataset about members of the Italian Parliament from 1996 to 2006. The empirical evidence shows that bad but dedicated politicians come along with good but not fully committed politicians. There is in fact a non-negligible fraction of citizens with remarkably high pre-election income who are appointed in parliament. These citizens are those who gain relatively more from being elected in terms of outside income. At the same time, they are less committed to the parliamentary activity in terms of voting attendance.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 94 (2010)
Issue (Month): 9-10 (October)
Pages: 688-699

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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:94:y:2010:i:9-10:p:688-699

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

Related research

Keywords: Politicians Adverse selection Absenteeism Outside income;

References

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  1. Caselli, Francesco & Morelli, Massimo, 2000. "Bad Politicians," CEPR Discussion Papers 2402, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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  7. Stefano Gagliarducci & Tommaso Nannicini & Paolo Naticchioni, 2007. "Electoral Rules And Politicians' Behavior: A Micro Test," Working Papers wp2007_0716, CEMFI.
  8. Manski, Charles F & Lerman, Steven R, 1977. "The Estimation of Choice Probabilities from Choice Based Samples," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(8), pages 1977-88, November.
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  11. Andrea Brandolini, 1999. "The Distribution of Personal Income in Post-War Italy: Source Description, Data Quality, and the Time Pattern of Income Inequality," Giornale degli Economisti, GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University, vol. 58(2), pages 183-239, September.
  12. George J. Stigler, 1967. "The Economics of Conflict of Interest," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 75, pages 100.
  13. Michael P. Keane & Antonio Merlo, 2010. "Money, Political Ambition, and the Career Decisions of Politicians," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 186-215, August.
  14. Stefano Gagliarducci & Tommaso Nannicini & Paolo Naticchioni, 2007. "Outside Income and Moral Hazard: The Elusive Quest for Good Politicians," Boston University - Department of Economics - The Institute for Economic Development Working Papers Series dp-164, Boston University - Department of Economics.
  15. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Geys, Benny & Mause, Karsten, 2011. "Moonlighting politicians: A survey and research agenda," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2011-101, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  2. Bernecker, Andreas, 2013. "Do Politicians Shirk when Reelection Is Certain? Evidence from the German Parliament," Working Papers 13-09, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
  3. Thomas Braendle & Alois Stutzer, 2010. "Political Selection of Public Servants and Parliamentary Oversight," Working papers 2010/08, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
  4. Peichl, Andreas & Pestel, Nico & Siegloch, Sebastian, 2011. "The Politicians' Wage Gap: Insights from German Members of Parliament," IZA Discussion Papers 5520, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  5. Massimo Bordignon & Matteo Gamalerio & Gilberto Turati, 2013. "Decentralization, Vertical Fiscal Imbalance, and Political Selection," CESifo Working Paper Series 4459, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Felix Arnold & Björn Kauder & Niklas Potrafke, 2014. "Outside Earnings, Absence, and Activity: Evidence from Germany Parliamentarians," CESifo Working Paper Series 4900, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. Raymond Fisman & Nikolaj A. Harmon & Emir Kamenica & Inger Munk, 2012. "Labor Supply of Politicians," NBER Working Papers 17726, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Geys, Benny, 2011. "Election cycles in MPs' outside interests? The UK House of Commons, 2005-2010," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2011-104, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  9. Vukovic, Vuk, 2011. "Political agency model of persistent electoral success with endogenous rents," MPRA Paper 39085, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 25 Jan 2012.
  10. Fedele, Alessandro & Naticchioni, Paolo, 2013. "Moonlighting Politicians: Motivation Matters!," IZA Discussion Papers 7500, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  11. Ulrich Matter & Alois Stutzer, 2013. "Do Lawyer-Legislators Protect Their Business? Evidence from Voting Behavior on Tort Reforms," Working papers 2013/09, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
  12. Felix Arnold, 2013. "German MPs' Outside Jobs and Their Repercussions on Parliamentary Effort," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1340, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  13. Thomas Braendle, 2013. "Do Institutions Affect Citizens' Selection into Politics?," Working papers 2013/04, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
  14. Thomas Braendle & Alois Stutzer, 2011. "Selection of Public Servants into Politics," Working papers 2011/06, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
  15. Naci Mocan & Duha T. Altindag, 2013. "Salaries and Work Effort: An Analysis of the European Union Parliamentarians," Auburn Economics Working Paper Series auwp2013-02, Department of Economics, Auburn University.

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