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Politicians’ outside earnings and electoral competition

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Author Info

  • Johannes Becker

    ()

  • Andreas Peichl

    ()

  • Johannes Rincke

    ()

Abstract

This paper deals with the impact of electoral competition on politicians' outside earnings. We propose a simple theoretical model with politicians facing a tradeoff between allocating their time to political effort or to an alternative use generating outside earnings. The model has a testable implication stating that the amount of time spent on outside work is negatively related to the degree of electoral competition. We test this implication using a new dataset on outside earnings of members of the German federal assembly. Taking into account the potential endogeneity of measures of political competition that depend on past election outcomes, we find that politicians facing low competition have substantially higher outside earnings.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-009-9426-y
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 140 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 379-394

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:140:y:2009:i:3:p:379-394

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

Related research

Keywords: Political competition; Outside earnings; Political rents;

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References

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  1. Messner, Matthias & Polborn, Mattias K., 2004. "Paying politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2423-2445, December.
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  2. Mattozzi, Andrea & Merlo, Antonio, 2008. "Political careers or career politicians?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 597-608, April.
  3. Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti & Roberto Perotti & Massimo Rostagno, 2002. "Electoral Systems And Public Spending," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(2), pages 609-657, May.
  4. Parker, Glenn R, 1992. " The Distribution of Honoraria Income in the U.S. Congress: Who Gets Rents in Legislatures and Why?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(2), pages 167-81, March.
  5. Gagliarducci, Stefano & Nannicini, Tommaso & Naticchioni, Paolo, 2008. "Electoral Rules and Politicians’ Behavior: A Micro Test," IZA Discussion Papers 3348, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. Bender, Bruce & Lott, John R, Jr, 1996. " Legislator Voting and Shirking: A Critical Review of the Literature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 87(1-2), pages 67-100, April.
  7. Caselli, Francesco & Morelli, Massimo, 2000. "Bad Politicians," CEPR Discussion Papers 2402, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Persson, T. & Tabellini, G., 1998. "The Size and Scope of Government: Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians," Papers 658, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
  9. Panu Poutvaara & Tuomas Takalo, 2003. "Candidate Quality," CESifo Working Paper Series 1106, CESifo Group Munich.
  10. Timothy Besley, 2005. "Political Selection," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 43-60, Summer.
  11. Myerson Roger B., 1993. "Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 118-132, January.
  12. Stefano Gagliarducci & Tommaso Nannicini & Paolo Naticchioni, 2007. "Outside income and moral hazard : the elusive quest for good politicians," Economics Working Papers we073218, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  13. Mattozzi, Andrea & Merlo, Antonio, 2007. "Mediocracy," CEPR Discussion Papers 6163, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, . "The size and the scope of government: Comparative politics with rational politicians," Working Papers 137, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Geys, Benny & Mause, Karsten, 2011. "Moonlighting politicians: A survey and research agenda," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2011-101, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  2. Peichl, Andreas & Pestel, Nico & Siegloch, Sebastian, 2011. "The politicians’ wage gap: insights from German members of parliament," MPRA Paper 34595, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Alessandro Fedele & Paolo Naticchioni, 2013. "Moonlighting Politicians: Motivation Matters!," BEMPS - Bozen Economics & Management Paper Series BEMPS08, School of Economics and Management at the Free University of Bozen.
  4. Libman, Alexander & Schultz, André & Graeber, Thomas, 2011. "Tax return as a political statement," Frankfurt School - Working Paper Series 169, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management.
  5. Andreas Polk, 2011. "Lobbying: Private Interests and Public Conduct," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 9(1), pages 3-7, 05.
  6. Naci Mocan & Duha T. Altindag, 2013. "Salaries and Work Effort: An Analysis of the European Union Parliamentarians," Auburn Economics Working Paper Series auwp2013-02, Department of Economics, Auburn University.
  7. Geys, Benny, 2011. "Election cycles in MPs' outside interests? The UK House of Commons, 2005-2010," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2011-104, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  8. Maria Paola & Vincenzo Scoppa, 2011. "Political competition and politician quality: evidence from Italian municipalities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(3), pages 547-559, September.
  9. Felix Arnold, 2013. "German MPs' Outside Jobs and Their Repercussions on Parliamentary Effort," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1340, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  10. Kaisa Kotakorpi & Panu Poutvaara & Marko Terviö, 2013. "Returns to Office in National and Local Politics," CESifo Working Paper Series 4542, CESifo Group Munich.
  11. Thomas Braendle, 2013. "Do Institutions Affect Citizens' Selection into Politics?," Working papers 2013/04, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
  12. Becker, Johannes & Peichl, Andreas & Rincke, Johannes, 2008. "Politicians' Outside Earnings and Political Competition," IZA Discussion Papers 3902, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  13. Thomas Braendle & Alois Stutzer, 2013. "Political selection of public servants and parliamentary oversight," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 45-76, February.
  14. Bernecker, Andreas, 2013. "Do Politicians Shirk when Reelection Is Certain? Evidence from the German Parliament," Working Papers 13-09, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.

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