We study political dynasties in the United States Congress since its inception in 1789. We document historic and geographic patterns in the evolution and profile of political dynasties, study the extent of dynastic bias in legislative politics versus other occupations, and analyze the connection between political dynasties and political competition. We also study the self-perpetuation of political elites. We find that legislators who enjoy longer tenures are significantly more likely to have relatives entering Congress later. Using instrumental variables methods, we establish that this relationship is causal: a longer period in power increases the chance that a person may start (or continue) a political dynasty. Therefore, dynastic political power is self-perpetuating in that a positive exogenous shock to a person's political power has persistent effects through posterior dynastic attainment. In politics, power begets power.
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Length: Date of creation: May 2007 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13122
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ERNESTO DAL BÓ & PEDRO DAL BÓ & JASON SNYDER, 2009.
"Political Dynasties,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 76(1), pages 115-142, 01.
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Paper
Ernesto Dal Bo & Pedro Dal Bo & Jason Snyder, .
"Political Dynasties,"
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2006-15, Brown University, Department of Economics.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets N41 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: Pre-1913 N42 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, and Regulation - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-
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Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Andrea Mattozzi & Antonio Merlo, 2006.
"Mediocracy,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
07-007, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
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Andrea Mattozzi & Antonio Merlo, 2007.
"Mediocracy,"
NBER Working Papers
12920, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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