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Selection of Public Servants into Politics

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Author Info

  • Thomas Braendle
  • Alois Stutzer

    () (University of Basel)

Abstract

Countries differ substantially in how they deal with politicians� that come from the public sector. Most constitutions include� incompatibility and� ineligibility rules� due� to� concerns about conflicts� of interest� and the politicization of the public� service.�� We study� how these rules affect� the attractiveness of parliamentary mandates� for public� servants and� thus� the selection into� politics. We compile� a� novel� dataset that� captures the� fraction� of public servants in 71 national� legislatures as well as the respective (in)compatibility regimes. On average, there� are� 7 percentage points� fewer public� servants in parliaments where� a strict regime� is in force.�� Supplementary evidence� shows� that� the� fraction� of public� servants� in parliament is positively correlated with government� consumption� as well as the absence� of corruption.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel in its series Working papers with number 2011/06.

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Date of creation: 2011
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Handle: RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2011/06

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Keywords: Political selection; public servants; incompatibility; political representation; corruption; government consumption;

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References

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  1. Dreher, Axel & Lamla, Michael J. & Lein, Sarah M. & Somogyi, Frank, 2009. "The impact of political leaders' profession and education on reforms," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 169-193, March.
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  3. Galasso, Vincenzo & Nannicini, Tommaso, 2009. "Competing on Good Politicians," IZA Discussion Papers 4282, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. Francesco Caselli & Massimo Morelli, 2001. "Bad Politicians," NBER Working Papers 8532, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Ferraz, Claudio & Finan, Frederico S., 2008. "Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance," IZA Discussion Papers 3411, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. Osborne, Martin J & Slivinski, Al, 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 65-96, February.
  7. Anne Aaken & Stefan Voigt, 2011. "Do individual disclosure rules for parliamentarians improve government effectiveness?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 301-324, December.
  8. Daniel Diermeier & Michael Keane & Antonio Merlo, 2002. "A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-037, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Sep 2004.
  9. Matthias Messner & Mattias Polborn, 2003. "Paying Politicians," Working Papers 246, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  10. Stefano Gagliarducci & Tommaso Nannicini, 2008. "Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection," Working Papers 346, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  11. Gagliarducci, Stefano & Nannicini, Tommaso & Naticchioni, Paolo, 2010. "Moonlighting politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 688-699, October.
  12. Gehlbach, Scott & Sonin, Konstantin, 2004. "Businessman Candidates: Special-Interest Politics in Weakly Institutionalized Environments," CEPR Discussion Papers 4822, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Danila Serra, 2006. "Empirical determinants of corruption: A sensitivity analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 126(1), pages 225-256, January.
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Cited by:
  1. Thomas Braendle, 2012. "Determinants of Employment in the Ministerial Bureaucracy," Working papers 2012/01, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.

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