Do Lawyer-Legislators Protect Their Business? Evidence from Voting Behavior on Tort Reforms
AbstractAttorneys elected to the US House of Representatives and to US state legislatures are systematically less likely to vote in favor of tort reforms that restrict tort litigation, but more likely to support bills that extend tort law. This finding is based on the analysis of 54 votes at the federal and state level between 1995 and 2012. It holds when controlling for legislators’ ideology and is particularly strong for term-limited lawyer-legislators. The empirical regularity is consistent with the hypothesis that lawyer-legislators, at least in part, pursue their business interests when voting on tort issues. Our results highlight the relevance of legislators’ identities and individual professional interests for economic policy making.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel in its series Working papers with number 2013/09.
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Lawyers; legislatures; rent-seeking; tort law; tort reform; voting behavior;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-06-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2013-06-04 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-LAW-2013-06-04 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-POL-2013-06-04 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Raghabendra Chattopadhyay & Esther Duflo, 2004. "Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(5), pages 1409-1443, 09.
- Thomas J. Miceli & Michael P. Stone, 2010.
"The Determinants of State-Level Caps on Punitive Damages: Theory and Evidence,"
2010-25, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Thomas J. Miceli & Michael P. Stone, 2013. "The Determinants Of State-Level Caps On Punitive Damages: Theory And Evidence," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 31(1), pages 110-125, 01.
- Ronen Avraham, 2007. "An Empirical Study of the Impact of Tort Reforms on Medical Malpractice Settlement Payments," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(S2), pages S183-S229, 06.
- Antonio Merlo & Andrea Mattozzi, 2005.
"Political Careers or Career Politicians?,"
2005 Meeting Papers
740, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Andrea Mattozzi & Antonio Merlo, 2007. "Political Careers or Career Politicians?," NBER Working Papers 12921, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Andrea Mattozzi & Antonio Merlo, 2005. "Political Careers or Career Politicians?," PIER Working Paper Archive 05-032, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Dec 2005.
- Mattozzi, Andrea & Merlo, Antonio, 2007. "Political Careers or Career Politicians?," CEPR Discussion Papers 6164, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Konstantin Sonin & Scott Gehlbach, 2004.
Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings
178, Econometric Society.
- Scott Gehlbach & Konstantin Sonin, 2004. "Businessman Candidates: Special-Interest Politics in Weakly Institutionalized Environments," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp733, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Gehlbach, Scott & Sonin, Konstantin, 2004. "Businessman Candidates: Special-Interest Politics in Weakly Institutionalized Environments," CEPR Discussion Papers 4822, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gehlbach, Scott & Sonin, Konstantin & Zhuravskaya, Ekaterina, 2006. "Businessman Candidates," CEPR Discussion Papers 5985, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Scott Gehlbach & Konstantin Sonin & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2006. "Businessman Candidates," Working Papers w0067, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Caselli, Francesco & Morelli, Massimo, 2004.
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 759-782, March.
- Francesco Caselli & Massimo Morelli, 2001. "Bad Politicians," NBER Working Papers 8532, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Caselli, Francesco & Morelli, Massimo, 2000. "Bad Politicians," CEPR Discussion Papers 2402, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Francesco Caselli & Massimo Morelli, 2000. "Bad politicians," Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics 134, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Timothy Besley, 2005. "Political Selection," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 43-60, Summer.
- Rubin, Paul H & Bailey, Martin J, 1994. "The Role of Lawyers in Changing the Law," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 807-31, June.
- Ai, Chunrong & Norton, Edward C., 2003. "Interaction terms in logit and probit models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 123-129, July.
- Horrace, William C. & Oaxaca, Ronald L., 2006. "Results on the bias and inconsistency of ordinary least squares for the linear probability model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 90(3), pages 321-327, March.
- Thomas Braendle & Alois Stutzer, 2011. "Selection of Public Servants into Politics," Working papers 2011/06, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
- Gagliarducci, Stefano & Nannicini, Tommaso & Naticchioni, Paolo, 2010. "Moonlighting politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 688-699, October.
- Rubin Paul H. & Shepherd Joanna M., 2008. "The Demographics of Tort Reform," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 4(2), pages 591-620, December.
- Carl Shapiro, 1991. "Symposium on the Economics of Liability," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 5(3), pages 3-10, Summer.
- Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1992.
"Incumbent Behavior: Vote Seeking, Tax Setting and Yardstick Competition,"
NBER Working Papers
4041, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 1995. "Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 25-45, March.
- Epstein, Richard A, 1988. "The Political Economy of Product Liability Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 311-15, May.
- Raghabendra Chattopadhyay & Esther Duflo, 2004. "Women as policy makers: Evidence from a randomized policy experiment in india," Framed Field Experiments 00224, The Field Experiments Website.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (WWZ).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.