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Public choice and tort reform

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  • Paul Rubin

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Abstract

The common law originally was thought to be immune to rent seeking. More recently, scholars have recognized that attorneys are engaged in exactly that activity. Rent seeking by the legal profession has greatly expanded the scope of US tort law, and generated efforts to reverse its expansion. Organized groups (attorneys, businesses and doctors) are active on both sides of the issue and the partisans have numerous tools available for advancing their agendas, such as litigating, lobbying for favorable rules and attempting to elect sympathetic legislators and judges. All of this creates an ideal setting for public choice analysis. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-005-4763-y
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 124 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 223-236

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:124:y:2005:i:1:p:223-236

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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  1. Tabarrok, Alexander & Helland, Eric, 1999. "Court Politics: The Political Economy of Tort Awards," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 157-88, April.
  2. Michelle J. White, 2004. "Asbestos and the Future of Mass Torts," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(2), pages 183-204, Spring.
  3. Rubin, Paul H & Curran, Christopher & Curran, John F, 2001. " Litigation versus Legislation: Forum Shopping by Rent Seekers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(3-4), pages 295-310, June.
  4. Fon, Vincy & Parisi, Francesco, 2003. " Litigation and the Evolution of Legal Remedies: A Dynamic Model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(3-4), pages 419-33, September.
  5. Rubin, Paul H & Bailey, Martin J, 1994. "The Role of Lawyers in Changing the Law," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 807-31, June.
  6. Michelle J. White, 2004. "Asbestos and the Future of Mass Torts," NBER Working Papers 10308, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Viscusi, W Kip, 1991. "The Dimensions of the Product Liability Crisis," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(1), pages 147-77, January.
  8. Epstein, Richard A, 1988. "The Political Economy of Product Liability Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 311-15, May.
  9. Calfee, John E & Rubin, Paul H, 1992. "Some Implications of Damage Payments for Nonpecuniary Losses," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 371-411, June.
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Cited by:
  1. Sophie Harnay & Alain Marciano, 2011. "Seeking rents through class actions and legislative lobbying: a comparison," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 293-304, October.
  2. Rubin, Paul H. & Shepherd, Joanna M., 2005. "Tort Reform and Accidental Deaths," Working paper 305, Regulation2point0.
  3. David Schap & Andrew Feeley, 2006. "The Collateral Source Rule: A Common Law Norm Under Special Interest Attack," Working Papers 0606, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
  4. Tim Friehe & Eric Langlais, 2014. "On the Political Economy of Public Safety Investments," EconomiX Working Papers 2014-8, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.

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