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Public choice and tort reform

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Author Info
Paul Rubin ()

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Abstract

The common law originally was thought to be immune to rent seeking. More recently, scholars have recognized that attorneys are engaged in exactly that activity. Rent seeking by the legal profession has greatly expanded the scope of US tort law, and generated efforts to reverse its expansion. Organized groups (attorneys, businesses and doctors) are active on both sides of the issue and the partisans have numerous tools available for advancing their agendas, such as litigating, lobbying for favorable rules and attempting to elect sympathetic legislators and judges. All of this creates an ideal setting for public choice analysis. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-005-4763-y
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 124 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (July)
Pages: 223-236
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:124:y:2005:i:1:p:223-236

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Viscusi, W Kip, 1991. "The Dimensions of the Product Liability Crisis," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(1), pages 147-77, January.
  2. Rubin, Paul H & Curran, Christopher & Curran, John F, 2001. " Litigation versus Legislation: Forum Shopping by Rent Seekers," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(3-4), pages 295-310, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Calfee, John E & Rubin, Paul H, 1992. "Some Implications of Damage Payments for Nonpecuniary Losses," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 371-411, June.
  4. Rubin, Paul H & Bailey, Martin J, 1994. "The Role of Lawyers in Changing the Law," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(2), pages 807-31, June.
  5. Michelle J. White, 2004. "Asbestos and the Future of Mass Torts," NBER Working Papers 10308, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Michelle J. White, 2004. "Asbestos and the Future of Mass Torts," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(2), pages 183-204, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Epstein, Richard A, 1988. "The Political Economy of Product Liability Reform," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 311-15, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Fon, Vincy & Parisi, Francesco, 2003. " Litigation and the Evolution of Legal Remedies: A Dynamic Model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 116(3-4), pages 419-33, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Tabarrok, Alexander & Helland, Eric, 1999. "Court Politics: The Political Economy of Tort Awards," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 157-88, April.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. David Schap & Andrew Feeley, 2006. "The Collateral Source Rule: A Common Law Norm Under Special Interest Attack," Working Papers 0606, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

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