Determinants of Employment in the Ministerial Bureaucracy
AbstractAbstract Senior officials in the ministerial bureaucracy are responsible for the coordination of public service activity� and their number has grown enormously since World War II. We study the growth in employment� of this politically� sensitive high-profile occupational group from a political economics perspective.� We analyze how political partisanship, political patronage after changes in government, and the selection of public servants into politics affect senior official employment. Based on a unique time-series, cross-sectional data set for the German Laender, we find mixed evidence for the effect that the political selection of public servants has on senior official employment. We find some evidence for political patronage.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel in its series Working papers with number 2012/01.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
political selection; public servants; public-sector growth; bureaucracy; patronage;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-06-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-PBE-2012-06-13 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2012-06-13 (Positive Political Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Stefano Gagliarducci & Tommaso Nannicini, 2013.
"Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives From Selection,"
Journal of the European Economic Association,
European Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 369-398, 04.
- Gagliarducci, Stefano & Nannicini, Tommaso, 2009. "Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection," IZA Discussion Papers 4400, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Stefano Gagliarducci & Tommaso Nannicini, 2008. "Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection," Working Papers 346, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Stefano Gagliarducci & Tommaso Nannicini, 2010. "Do Better Paid Politicians Perform Better? Disentangling Incentives from Selection," CEIS Research Paper 162, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 28 May 2010.
- Niklas Potrafke, 2011.
"Public Expenditures on Education and Cultural Affairs in the West German States: Does Government Ideology Influence the Budget Composition?,"
German Economic Review,
Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(1), pages 124-145, 02.
- Potrafke, Niklas, 2011. "Public Expenditures on Education and Cultural Affairs in the West German States: Does Government Ideology Influence the Budget Composition?," Munich Reprints in Economics 19277, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Raghabendra Chattopadhyay & Esther Duflo, 2004.
"Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India,"
Econometric Society, vol. 72(5), pages 1409-1443, 09.
- Raghabendra Chattopadhyay & Esther Duflo, 2004. "Women as policy makers: Evidence from a randomized policy experiment in india," Framed Field Experiments 00224, The Field Experiments Website.
- Blais, Andre & Nadeau, Richard, 1992. " The Electoral Budget Cycle," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 74(4), pages 389-403, December.
- Alberto Alesina & Nouriel Roubini & Gerald D. Cohen, 1997. "Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262510944, December.
- Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2007.
"Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
321307000000000870, David K. Levine.
- Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2007. "Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 169-179, March.
- Beate Jochimsen & Robert Nuscheler, 2011. "The political economy of the German Lander deficits: weak governments meet strong finance ministers," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(19), pages 2399-2415.
- Couch, Jim F & Atkinson, Keith E & Shughart, William F, II, 1992. " Ethics Laws and the Outside Earnings of Politicians: The Case of Alabama's "Legislator-Educators."," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 73(2), pages 135-45, March.
- Galli, Emma & Rossi, Stefania P S, 2002. " Political Budget Cycles: The Case of the Western German Lander," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 110(3-4), pages 283-303, March.
- Anderson, T. W. & Hsiao, Cheng, 1982. "Formulation and estimation of dynamic models using panel data," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 47-82, January.
- Thomas Braendle & Alois Stutzer, 2011. "Selection of Public Servants into Politics," Working papers 2011/06, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
- Thomas Braendle & Alois Stutzer, 2010. "Public servants in parliament: theory and evidence on its determinants in Germany," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(1), pages 223-252, October.
- de Haan, Jakob & Sturm, Jan-Egbert, 1994. " Political and Institutional Determinants of Fiscal Policy in the European Community," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 80(1-2), pages 157-72, July.
- Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2007.
"Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part II: Multiple Policy Tasks,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
321307000000000875, David K. Levine.
- Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 2008. "Bureaucrats or politicians? Part II: Multiple policy tasks," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 426-447, April.
- Timothy Besley & Jose G. Montalvo & Marta Reynal‐Querol, 2011. "Do Educated Leaders Matter?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(554), pages F205-, 08.
- Giovanni S.F. Bruno, 2004.
"Approximating the Bias of the LSDV Estimator for Dynamic Unbalanced Panel Data Models,"
KITeS Working Papers
159, KITeS, Centre for Knowledge, Internationalization and Technology Studies, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy, revised Jul 2004.
- Bruno, Giovanni S.F., 2005. "Approximating the bias of the LSDV estimator for dynamic unbalanced panel data models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 87(3), pages 361-366, June.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (WWZ).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.