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Moonlighting Politicians: Motivation Matters!

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  • Fedele, Alessandro

    ()
    (Free University of Bozen/Bolzano)

  • Naticchioni, Paolo

    ()
    (University of Rome 3)

Abstract

In this paper we study optimal choices of self-selection into politics and commitment once in office on the part of citizens with heterogeneous abilities and heterogeneous motivations. Politicians can moonlight, i.e., they can work in the market sector while appointed in parliament. Our theoretical framework shows that high-ability citizens may enter politics. Yet while high-ability non-motivated (market-fit) politicians are likely to shirk, high-ability motivated (public-fit) ones are more committed to parliamentary activity. We test our predictions by using a unique database of Italian parliamentarians for the period 1996-2006. We find evidence of advantageous selection of the market-fit and the public-fit politicians in that they both display a pre-election income greater than that of the Italian population. We also show that the commitment of the market-fit parliamentarians in terms of voting attendance is negatively affected by income opportunities, whilst this is not the case for the public-fit ones.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 7500.

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Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7500

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Keywords: motivation; moonlighting politicians;

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  1. Heyes, Anthony, 2005. "The economics of vocation or 'why is a badly paid nurse a good nurse'?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 561-569, May.
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  3. Andrea Mattozzi & Antonio Merlo, 2007. "Political Careers or Career Politicians?," NBER Working Papers 12921, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Ernesto Dal Bó & Frederico Finan & Martín A. Rossi, 2013. "Strengthening State Capabilities: The Role of Financial Incentives in the Call to Public Service," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 128(3), pages 1169-1218.
  5. Becker, Johannes & Peichl, Andreas & Rincke, Johannes, 2007. "Politicians' outside earnings and electoral competition," FiFo Discussion Papers - Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 08-3, University of Cologne, FiFo Institute for Public Economics.
  6. Josse Delfgaauw & Robert Dur, 2003. "Signaling and Screening of Workers' motivation," CESifo Working Paper Series 1099, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. Josse Delfgaauw & Robert Dur, 2008. "Managerial Talent, Motivation, and Self-Selection into Public Management," CESifo Working Paper Series 2437, CESifo Group Munich.
  8. Tim Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2005. "Competition and incentives with motivated agents," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library 928, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  9. Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, 2009. "Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance," NBER Working Papers 14906, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Klaas Beniers & Robert Dur, 2007. "Politicians’ motivation, political culture, and electoral competition," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 29-54, February.
  11. Thomas Braendle & Alois Stutzer, 2013. "Political selection of public servants and parliamentary oversight," Economics of Governance, Springer, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 45-76, February.
  12. Timothy Besley, 2005. "Political Selection," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 43-60, Summer.
  13. Besley, Timothy & Folke, Olle & Persson, Torsten & Rickne, Johanna, 2013. "Gender Quotas and the Crisis of the Mediocre Man: Theory and Evidence from Sweden," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics 985, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
  14. Gagliarducci, Stefano & Nannicini, Tommaso & Naticchioni, Paolo, 2010. "Moonlighting politicians," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 688-699, October.
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Cited by:
  1. Felix Arnold & Björn Kauder & Niklas Potrafke, 2014. "Outside Earnings, Absence, and Activity: Evidence from Germany Parliamentarians," CESifo Working Paper Series 4900, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Alessandro Fedele & Pierpaolo Giannoccolo, 2013. "Moneycracy," BEMPS - Bozen Economics & Management Paper Series, School of Economics and Management at the Free University of Bozen BEMPS07, School of Economics and Management at the Free University of Bozen.
    • A. Fedele & P. Giannoccolo, 2013. "Moneycracy," Working Papers wp893, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.

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