The economics of vocation or 'why is a badly paid nurse a good nurse'?
AbstractGiven the longstanding shortage of nurses in many jurisdictions, why couldnât nursing wages be raised to attract more people into the profession? We tell a story in which the status of nursing as a âvocationâ implies that increasing wages reduces the average quality of applicants attracted. The underlying mechanism accords with the notion that increasing wages might attract the âwrong sortâ of people into the profession and highlights an (in)e?ciency wage mechanism, particular to vocations, which makes wages sticky upwards. The analysis has implications for job design in vocation-based sectors such as nursing and teaching.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Health Economics.
Volume (Year): 24 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505560
Other versions of this item:
- Anthony Heyes, 2003. "The Economics of Vocation or Why is a Badly Paid Nurse a Good Nurse?," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 03/4, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Dec 2003.
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