Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Les Modes de Rémunération comme MécanismesSélectifs de la Main d'oeuvre : Fondements Théoriques et Estimations Empiriques

Contents:

Author Info

  • Sabrina Teyssier

    () (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Comme Saint-Paul (2001) montre que des travailleurs avec des niveaux de productivité proches ont tendance à se retrouver dans les mêmes firmes, on peut s’interroger sur le pouvoir sélectif des mécanismes de rémunération. Le modèle théorique de Lazear (2000) met en avant l’'existence à la fois des effets d’'incitation et de sélection d'’un mode de rémunération indexé sur la performance des employés. Ce modèle a été testé à l’'aide de différentes méthodes d'’estimation et la majorité d'’entre elles supportent les prédictions théoriques.Ce modèle a été étendu à des travaux théoriques et empiriques supportant l’'hypothèse d'’auto-sélection des travailleurs en fonction de leurs caractéristiques intrinsèques telles que l’'aversion au risque, la motivation intrinsèque ou encore les préférences sociales. Enfin, il est montré que l’'hétérogénéité de la main d’'oeuvre contribue à l’'effcience du marché si lestravailleurs s’'auto-sélectionnent dans différentes organisations.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/30/37/03/PDF/0818.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by HAL in its series Post-Print with number halshs-00303703.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: 2008
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00303703

    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00303703/en/
    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/

    Related research

    Keywords: rémunération à la performance ; incitations ; auto-sélection ; aversion à l'inégalité ; compétition ; partage de revenu;

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Orana Bandiera & Iwan Barankay & Imran Rasul, 2005. "Social preferences and the response to incentives: Evidence from personnel data," Natural Field Experiments 00212, The Field Experiments Website.
    2. Tor Eriksson & Sabrina Teyssier & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2006. "Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments," Working Papers 0603, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
    3. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-64, October.
    4. Daniel Parent, 1997. "Methods of Pay and Earnings: A Longitudinal Analysis," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-14, CIRANO.
    5. Jason Barro & Nancy Beaulieu, 2003. "Selection and Improvement: Physician Responses to Financial Incentives," NBER Working Papers 10017, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Carpenter, Jeffrey P. & Seki, Erika, 2005. "Do Social Preferences Increase Productivity? Field Experimental Evidence from Fishermen in Toyama Bay," IZA Discussion Papers 1697, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    7. Bellemare, Charles & Shearer, Bruce S., 2006. "Sorting, Incentives and Risk Preferences: Evidence from a Field Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 2227, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    8. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2005. "Identity and the Economics of Organizations," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(1), pages 9-32, Winter.
    9. Thomas Dohmen & Armin Falk, 2011. "Performance Pay and Multidimensional Sorting: Productivity, Preferences, and Gender," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 556-90, April.
    10. Nyborg, Karine & Brekke, Kjell Arne, 2009. "Selfish Bakers, Caring Nurses? A Model of Work Motivation," HERO On line Working Paper Series 2008:1, Oslo University, Health Economics Research Programme.
    11. Edward Lazear & Ulrike Malmendier & Roberto Weber, 2006. "Sorting, Prices, and Social Preferences," NBER Working Papers 12041, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Barton H. Hamilton & Jack A. Nickerson & Hideo Owan, 2003. "Team Incentives and Worker Heterogeneity: An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Teams on Productivity and Participation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(3), pages 465-497, June.
    13. Edward P. Lazear, 2000. "Performance Pay and Productivity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1346-1361, December.
    14. Thomas Lemieux & W. Bentley MacLeod & Daniel Parent, 2007. "Performance Pay and Wage Inequality," NBER Working Papers 13128, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Ewing, Bradley T., 1996. "Wages and performance-based pay: Evidence from the NLSY," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 241-246, May.
    16. Bruce Shearer, 2004. "Piece Rates, Fixed Wages and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 513-534.
    17. Alan B. Krueger & David A. Schkade, 2007. "Sorting in the Labor Market: Do Gregarious Workers Flock to Interactive Jobs?," Working Papers 63, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Center for Economic Policy Studies..
    18. Francois, Patrick, 2000. "'Public service motivation' as an argument for government provision," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(3), pages 275-299, November.
    19. Heyes, Anthony, 2005. "The economics of vocation or 'why is a badly paid nurse a good nurse'?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 561-569, May.
    20. Daron Acemoglu, 1998. "Changes in Unemployment and Wage Inequality: An Alternative Theory and Some Evidence," NBER Working Papers 6658, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Muriel Niederle & Lise Vesterlund, 2005. "Do Women Shy Away from Competition? Do Men Compete too Much?," Discussion Papers 04-030, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    22. Bonin, Holger & Dohmen, Thomas & Falk, Armin & Huffman, David & Sunde, Uwe, 2007. "Cross-sectional earnings risk and occupational sorting: The role of risk attitudes," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(6), pages 926-937, December.
    23. Josse Delfgaauw & Robert Dur, 2004. "Incentives and Workers' Motivation in the Public Sector," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-060/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    24. Jerry R. Green & Nancy L. Stokey, 1982. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts," NBER Working Papers 0840, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    25. Cabrales, Antonio & Antoni, Calvó-Armengol, . "Interdependent preferences and segregating equilibria," Open Access publications from Universidad Carlos III de Madrid info:hdl:10016/3658, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
    26. Daniel A. Ackerberg & Maristella Botticini, 1999. "Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form," Papers 0096, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
    27. Eriksson, Tor & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2004. "Other-Regarding Preferences and Performance Pay – An Experiment on Incentives and Sorting," IZA Discussion Papers 1191, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    28. Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 2002. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1644-1655, December.
    29. Michael Kremer & Eric Maskin, 1996. "Wage Inequality and Segregation by Skill," NBER Working Papers 5718, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    30. Bandiera, Oriana & Barankay, Iwan & Rasul, Imran, 2006. "Incentives for Managers and Inequality Among Workers: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 5649, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    31. Charles Brown & James L. Medoff, 1989. "The Employer Size-Wage Effect," NBER Working Papers 2870, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    32. Smith, Vernon L, 1982. "Microeconomic Systems as an Experimental Science," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 923-55, December.
    33. Canice Prendergast, 2007. "The Motivation and Bias of Bureaucrats," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 180-196, March.
    34. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
    35. Antonio Cabrales & Raffaele Miniaci & Marco Piovesan & Giovanni Ponti, 2007. "An experiment on markets and contracts : do social preferences determine corporate culture?," Economics Working Papers we072010, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
    36. repec:sae:jospec:v:1:y:2000:i:4:p:323-340 is not listed on IDEAS
    37. Eriksson, T., 2001. "How Common Are The New Compensation and Work Organization Practices and Who Adopts Them?," Papers 01-8, Aarhus School of Business - Department of Economics.
    38. Bruce Shearer, 2004. "Piece Rates, Fixed Wages and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(2), pages 513-534, 04.
    39. Ramarao Desiraju & David E. M. Sappington, 2007. "Equity and Adverse Selection," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(2), pages 285-318, 06.
    40. Grund, Christian & Sliwka, Dirk, 2006. "Performance Pay and Risk Aversion," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 101, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    41. Claudia Keser & Claude Montmarquette, 2007. "Voluntary Teaming and Effort," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 745, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    42. Barry J. Nalebuff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1983. "Prices and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 21-43, Spring.
    43. Seiler, Eric, 1984. "Piece Rate vs. Time Rate: The Effect of Incentives on Earnings," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 66(3), pages 363-76, August.
    44. Green, Jerry & Stokey, Nancy, 1983. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts," Scholarly Articles 3203644, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    45. Burks, Stephen V. & Carpenter, Jeffrey P. & Götte, Lorenz & Monaco, Kristen & Porter, Kay & Rustichini, Aldo, 2007. "Using Behavioral Economic Experiments at a Large Motor Carrier: The Context and Design of the Truckers and Turnover Project," IZA Discussion Papers 2789, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    46. repec:feb:natura:0015 is not listed on IDEAS
    47. repec:sae:jospec:v:1:y:2000:i:2:p:99-123 is not listed on IDEAS
    48. Frey, Bruno S., 1993. "Shirking or work morale? : The impact of regulating," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 37(8), pages 1523-1532, December.
    49. Steve J. Davis & John Haltiwanger, 1991. "Wage Dispersion Between and Within U.S. Manufacturing Plants, 1963-1986," NBER Working Papers 3722, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    50. Gilles Saint Paul, 1999. "On the distribution of income and worker assignment under intra-firm spillovers, with an application to ideas and networks," Economics Working Papers 417, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    51. Daniel Parent, 2001. "The Effect of Pay-for-Performance Contracts on Wages," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-05, CIRANO.
    52. repec:aea:jeclit:v:43:y:2005:i:2:p:392-436 is not listed on IDEAS
    53. George A. Akerlof & Rachel E. Kranton, 2000. "Economics And Identity," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(3), pages 715-753, August.
    54. O'Keeffe, Mary & Viscusi, W Kip & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1984. "Economic Contests: Comparative Reward Schemes," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 2(1), pages 27-56, January.
    55. Josse Delfgaauw & Robert Dur, 2004. "Incentives and Workers’ Motivation in the Public Sector," CESifo Working Paper Series 1223, CESifo Group Munich.
    56. Sherwin Rosen, 1982. "Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 311-323, Autumn.
    57. Le Grand, Julian, 2003. "Motivation, Agency, and Public Policy: Of Knights and Knaves, Pawns and Queens," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199266999, September.
    58. repec:feb:natura:0014 is not listed on IDEAS
    59. Lazear, Edward P, 1986. "Salaries and Piece Rates," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(3), pages 405-31, July.
    60. Booth, Alison L & Frank, Jeff, 1999. "Earnings, Productivity, and Performance-Related Pay," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(3), pages 447-63, July.
    61. John Pencavel, 1975. "Work Effort On-the-Job Screening, and Alternative Methods of Remuneration," Working Papers 443, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
    62. Caplan, Bryan, 2003. "Stigler-Becker versus Myers-Briggs: why preference-based explanations are scientifically meaningful and empirically important," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 391-405, April.
    63. Kreps, David M, 1997. "Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsic Incentives," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(2), pages 359-64, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00303703

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.