Selection and Improvement: Physician Responses to Financial Incentives
AbstractIn this study we examine the effects of transferring physicians from a compensation system based on salary to a profit-sharing system. Consistent with theory, we find that the change has a large and significant effect on the quantity of services provided. In addition, we find a selection effect, where the least productive doctors leave the company and more productive doctors join.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 10017.
Date of creation: Oct 2003
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health
- J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-07-18 (All new papers)
- NEP-EDU-2003-11-30 (Education)
- NEP-FIN-2003-11-30 (Finance)
- NEP-HEA-2004-07-18 (Health Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Edward P. Lazear, 2000.
"Performance Pay and Productivity,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1346-1361, December.
- Gaynor, Martin & Pauly, Mark V, 1990. "Compensation and Productive Efficiency of Partnerships: Evidence from Medical Group Practice," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(3), pages 544-73, June.
- Damien Échevin & Bernard Fortin, 2011.
"Physician Payment Mechanisms, Hospital Length of Stay and Risk of Readmission: a Natural Experiment,"
CIRANO Working Papers
- Damien Échevin & Bernard Fortin, 2011. "Physician Payment Mechanisms, Hospital Length of Stay and Risk of Readmission: a Natural Experiment," Cahiers de recherche 1112, CIRPEE.
- Randall D. Cebul & James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor & Mark E. Votruba, 2008.
"Organizational Fragmentation and Care Quality in the U.S. Healthcare System,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
American Economic Association, vol. 22(4), pages 93-113, Fall.
- Randall D. Cebul & James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor & Mark Votruba, 2008. "Organizational Fragmentation and Care Quality in the U.S. Health Care System," NBER Working Papers 14212, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dumont, Etienne & Fortin, Bernard & Jacquemet, Nicolas & Shearer, Bruce, 2008.
"Physicians' multitasking and incentives: Empirical evidence from a natural experiment,"
Journal of Health Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 27(6), pages 1436-1450, December.
- Etienne Dumont & Bernard Fortin & Nicolas Jacquemet & Bruce Shearer, 2007. "Physicians' Multitasking and Incentives: Empirical Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Cahiers de recherche 0745, CIRPEE.
- Etienne Dumont & Bernard Fortin & Nicolas Jacquemet & Bruce S. Shearer, 2008. "Physicians’ Multitasking and Incentives: Empirical Evidence from a Natural Experiment," CIRANO Working Papers 2008s-20, CIRANO.
- Dumont, Etienne & Fortin, Bernard & Jacquemet, Nicolas & Shearer, Bruce S., 2007. "Physicians' Multitasking and Incentives: Empirical Evidence from a Natural Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 3229, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Kaestner, Robert & Guardado, Jose, 2008. "Medicare reimbursement, nurse staffing, and patient outcomes," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 339-361, March.
- Eriksson, Tor & Villeval, Marie-Claire, 2008.
"Performance Pay, Sorting and Social Motivation,"
07-12, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Rudy Douven & Remco Mocking & Ilaria Mosca, 2012. "The Effect of Physician Fees and Density Differences on Regional Variation in Hospital Treatments," CPB Discussion Paper 208, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
- Sabrina Teyssier, 2008.
"Les Modes de Rémunération comme MécanismesSélectifs de la Main d'oeuvre : Fondements Théoriques et Estimations Empiriques,"
- Sabrina Teyssier, 2008. "Les Modes de Rémunération comme Mécanismes Sélectifs de la Main d’oeuvre : Fondements Théoriques et Estimations Empiriques," Working Papers 0818, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
- Lorens A. Helmchen & Anthony T. Lo Sasso, 2010. "How sensitive is physician performance to alternative compensation schedules? Evidence from a large network of primary care clinics," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(11), pages 1300-1317.
- repec:hal:journl:halshs-00305308 is not listed on IDEAS
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.