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Les Modes de Rémunération comme Mécanismes Sélectifs de la Main d’oeuvre : Fondements Théoriques et Estimations Empiriques

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Author Info
Sabrina Teyssier () (GATE, University of Lyon, CNRS, ENS-LSH, Centre Léon Bérard, France)
Abstract

Comme Saint-Paul (2001) montre que des travailleurs avec des niveaux de productivité proches ont tendance à se retrouver dans les mêmes firmes, on peut s’interroger sur le pouvoir sélectif des mécanismes de rémunération. Le modèle théorique de Lazear (2000) met en avant l’existence à la fois des effets d’incitation et de sélection d’un mode de rémunération indexé sur la performance des employés. Ce modèle a été testé à l’aide de différentes méthodes d’estimation et la majorité d’entre elles supportent les prédictions théoriques. Ce modèle a été étendu à des travaux théoriques et empiriques supportant l’hypothèse d’auto-sélection des travailleurs en fonction de leurs caractéristiques intrinsèques telles que l’aversion au risque, la motivation intrinsèque ou encore les préférences sociales. Enfin, il est montré que l’hétérogénéité de la main d’oeuvre contribue à l’efficience du marché si les travailleurs s’auto-sélectionnent dans différentes organisations.

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Paper provided by Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure in its series Working Papers with number 0818.

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Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:gat:wpaper:0818

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Related research
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment; Macroeconomic stability; Economic Growth; Middle East and North Africa; Two-stage Least Squares; Generalized Moments Methods;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C32 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Time-Series Models; Dynamic Quantile Regressions
C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data
F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business
F43 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Economic Growth of Open Economies

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