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Les Modes de Rémunération comme MécanismesSélectifs de la Main d'oeuvre : Fondements Théoriques et Estimations Empiriques

  • Sabrina Teyssier

    ()

    (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines)

Comme Saint-Paul (2001) montre que des travailleurs avec des niveaux de productivité proches ont tendance à se retrouver dans les mêmes firmes, on peut s’interroger sur le pouvoir sélectif des mécanismes de rémunération. Le modèle théorique de Lazear (2000) met en avant l’'existence à la fois des effets d’'incitation et de sélection d'’un mode de rémunération indexé sur la performance des employés. Ce modèle a été testé à l’'aide de différentes méthodes d'’estimation et la majorité d'’entre elles supportent les prédictions théoriques.Ce modèle a été étendu à des travaux théoriques et empiriques supportant l’'hypothèse d'’auto-sélection des travailleurs en fonction de leurs caractéristiques intrinsèques telles que l’'aversion au risque, la motivation intrinsèque ou encore les préférences sociales. Enfin, il est montré que l’'hétérogénéité de la main d’'oeuvre contribue à l’'effcience du marché si lestravailleurs s’'auto-sélectionnent dans différentes organisations.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00303703
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