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Voluntary Teaming and Effort

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Author Info
Claudia Keser ()
Claude Montmarquette ()

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Abstract

In a series of experimental effort games each of two players may choose between remuneration based on either private or team effort. Although at least one of the players has the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy to choose remuneration based on private effort, we frequently observe team remuneration chosen by both players. Team remuneration allows for high payoff for cooperation to each player, but at the same time provides individual incentives to take a free ride on the other player's effort. Due to significant cooperation we observe that in team remuneration participants make higher profits than in private remuneration. We also observe that when participants are not given the option of private remuneration they cooperate significantly less.

Dans cette étude expérimentale, chaque paire de participants doit choisir entre une forme de rémunération d'équipe ou privée pour leurs efforts consentis. Même si le choix de la forme privée de rémunération est pour au moins un des deux joueurs une stratégie d'équilibre parfait en sous-jeu, nous observons que la rémunération d'équipe est fréquemment choisie par les deux joueurs. La rémunération d'équipe permet un profit élevé de collaboration pour chaque joueur, mais elle incite également au resquillage sur le niveau d'effort de l'autre participant. Fruit de cette collaboration, nous observons que les participants affichent des profits plus élevés relativement au choix de la structure privée de rémunération. Finalement, lorsque les participants sont soumis à la rémunération d'équipe, ils coopèrent moins que lorsque cette option est volontairement choisie.

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Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 2004s-49.

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Date of creation: 01 Nov 2004
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Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2004s-49

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Related research
Keywords: team effort; workforce management; experimental economics; effort d'équipe; gestion des ressources humaines; économie expérimentale;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocitys," IEW - Working Papers iewwp040, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. repec:att:wimass:19939 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Claudia Keser, 2000. "Strategically Planned Behavior in Public Good Experiments," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-35, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  4. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 2003. "Altruistic Punishment in Humans," Microeconomics 0305006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  5. Sefton, Martin & Steinberg, Richard, 1996. "Reward structures in public good experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 263-287, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Holt, Charles A. & Laury, Susan K., 2008. "Theoretical Explanations of Treatment Effects in Voluntary Contributions Experiments," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Zhuang, Juzhong & Xu, Chenggang, 1996. " Profit-Sharing and Financial Performance in the Chinese State Enterprises: Evidence from Panel Data," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 205-22.
  8. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Hirshlifer, David & Rassmusen, Eric, 1989. "Cooperation in a repeated prisoners' dilemma with ostracism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 87-106, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
  11. Renate Schubert et al., 1999. "Financial Decision-Making: Are Women Really More Risk-Averse?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(2), pages 381-385, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Keser, Claudia, 1996. "Voluntary contributions to a public good when partial contribution is a dominant strategy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 359-366, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Keser, Claudia & van Winden, Frans, 2000. " Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 102(1), pages 23-39, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Karl-Martin Ehrhart & Claudia Keser, 1999. "Mobility and Cooperation: On the Run," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-24, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  15. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers iewwp004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Claudia Keser & Frans A.A.M. van Winden, 2000. "Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-011/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  17. Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Keser, Claudia, 1999. "Mobility and cooperation: on the run," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 99-69, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  19. Cachon, Gerard P & Camerer, Colin F, 1996. "Loss-Avoidance and Forward Induction in Experimental Coordination Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(1), pages 165-94, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Jana Vyrastekova & Sander Onderstal & Pierre Koning, 2006. "Team incentives in public organisations; an experimental study," CPB Discussion Papers 60, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. [Downloadable!]
  2. Kene Boun My & Benoît Chalvignac, 2009. "Voluntary participation and cooperation in a collective-good game," Working Papers of BETA 2009-01, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg. [Downloadable!]
  3. Sabrina Teyssier, 2008. "Les Modes de Rémunération comme MécanismesSélectifs de la Main d’oeuvre : Fondements Théoriques et Estimations Empiriques," Post-Print halshs-00303703_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  4. Sabrina Teyssier, 2008. "Experimental Evidence on Inequity Aversion and Self-Selection between Incentive Contracts," Working Papers 0821, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
  5. Sabrina Teyssier, 2008. "Les Modes de Rémunération comme Mécanismes Sélectifs de la Main d’oeuvre : Fondements Théoriques et Estimations Empiriques," Working Papers 0818, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
  6. Sabrina Teyssier, 2008. "Experimental Evidence on Inequity Aversion and Self-Selection between Incentive Contracts," Post-Print halshs-00303727_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
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