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Mobility and Cooperation: On the Run

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Author Info
Karl-Martin Ehrhart
Claudia Keser ()
Abstract

In public goods experiments where subjects may change groups, we observe a continual flight of the more cooperative subjects away from the less cooperative ones. The less cooperative subjects attempt to enter cooperative groups in order to free-ride on their contributions.

Lorsque les sujets peuvent changer de groupes dans les expériences sur les contributions volontaires aux biens publics, nous observons que les sujets plus coopératifs délaissent les sujets moins coopératifs. De plus, ces derniers essaient de joindre les groupes coopératifs pour profiter comme resquilleurs de leurs contributions.

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Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 99s-24.

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Date of creation: 01 Jun 1999
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Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:99s-24

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Related research
Keywords: Public goods; Tiebout hypothesis; migration; experimental economics; Biens publics; hypothèse de Tiebout; migration; économie expérimentale;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Roger Lagunoff, 1995. "On the dynamic selection of mechanisms for provisions of public projects," Discussion Paper / Institute for Empirical Macroeconomics 100, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Keser, Claudia, 1997. "SUPER: Strategies used in public goods experimentation rounds," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 97-24, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  3. Isaac, R Mark & Walker, James M, 1988. "Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(1), pages 179-99, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Sven Fischer & Andreas Nicklisch, 2006. "Ex Interim Voting in Public Good Provision," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_23, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
  2. Claudia Keser & Claude Montmarquette, 2004. "Voluntary Teaming and Effort," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-49, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Roberto Burlando & Francesco Guala, 2005. "Heterogeneous Agents in Public Goods Experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 35-54, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Coricelli, Giorgio & Fehr, Dietmar & Fellner, Gerlinde, 2004. "Partner Selection in Public Goods Experiments," Economics Series 151, Institute for Advanced Studies. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Sven Fischer & Andreas Nicklisch, 2006. "Ex Interim Voting in Public Good Provision," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-13, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  6. Sabrina Teyssier, 2007. "Optimal Group Incentives with Social Preferences and Self-Selection," Working Papers 0710, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
  7. Thomas Farole & Andrés Rodríguez-Pose & Michael Storper, 2007. "Social capital, rules, and institutions: A cross-country investigation," Working Papers 2007-12, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales. [Downloadable!]
  8. Michael Kosfeld, . "Network Experiments," IEW - Working Papers iewwp152, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
  9. Matthias Cinyabuguma & Talbot Page & Louis Putterman, 2004. "Cooperation Under the Threat of Expulsion in a Public Goods Experiment," Working Papers 2004-05, Brown University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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