Mobility and Cooperation: On the Run
AbstractIn public goods experiments where subjects may change groups, we observe a continual flight of the more cooperative subjects away from the less cooperative ones. The less cooperative subjects attempt to enter cooperative groups in order to free-ride on their contributions. Lorsque les sujets peuvent changer de groupes dans les expériences sur les contributions volontaires aux biens publics, nous observons que les sujets plus coopératifs délaissent les sujets moins coopératifs. De plus, ces derniers essaient de joindre les groupes coopératifs pour profiter comme resquilleurs de leurs contributions.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 99s-24.
Date of creation: 01 Jun 1999
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Public goods; Tiebout hypothesis; migration; experimental economics; Biens publics; hypothèse de Tiebout; migration; économie expérimentale;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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