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SUPER: Strategies used in public goods experimentation rounds

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  • Keser, Claudia

    ()
    (Institut für Statistik und Mathematische Wirtschaftstheorie)

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    Abstract

    We asked subjects to submit strategies for playing a specific public good game. The strategies were then made to interact with each other in a computer simulation. afterwards, the subjects twice had the opportunity to revise and resubmit their strategies for a second and a third simulation round. The average contribution to the public good increased from one simulation to the next. While for the first simulation round the dominant strategy solution of the game was submitted 7 times, this strategy had entirely disappeared by the third simulation. The majority of the strategies submitted for the third simulation show the same pattern. In the first period, players contribute the entire token endowment to the public good. Then, in each period, they reciprocate, the other players' average contribution in the previous period. In the final period(s), however, they play the dominant strategy solution, whatever the history of the game.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim in its series Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications with number 97-24.

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    Length: 42 pages
    Date of creation: 01 Jul 1997
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:xrs:sfbmaa:97-24

    Note: Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, SFB 504, at the University of Mannheim, is gratefully acknowledged.
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    Cited by:
    1. Karl-Martin Ehrhart & Claudia Keser, 1999. "Mobility and Cooperation: On the Run," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-24, CIRANO.
    2. Keser, Claudia & van Winden, Frans, 2000. " Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 102(1), pages 23-39, March.
    3. Keser, Claudia & Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Berninghaus, Siegfried K., 1998. "Coordination and local interaction: experimental evidence," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 269-275, March.
    4. Maria Vittoria Levati, . "Explaining Private Provision of Public Goods by Conditional Cooperation - An Evoltuionary Approach -," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-44, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    5. Simon Gaechter & Armin Falk, 2001. "Reputation or Reciprocity? An Experimental Investigation," CESifo Working Paper Series 496, CESifo Group Munich.
    6. Selten, Reinhard, 1998. "Features of experimentally observed bounded rationality," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 413-436, May.
    7. Falk, Armin & Gächter, Simon, 2001. "Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for Labour Relations," CEPR Discussion Papers 3018, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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