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Le financement des biens publics par des contributions volontaires: Une évaluation à l'aide de l'économie expérimentale

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Author Info
Claudia Keser ()
Abstract

In this article we evaluate the problems that arise when it comes to the financing of public goods and services. More specifically, we consider the financing of public goods by voluntary contributions. Although economic theory predicts free riding and thus an inefficient provision of the public good, we observe in many experiments that participants are willing to contribute more than predicted. We identify conditions that favor high contribution levels.

Dans cet article nous évaluons des problèmes qui se posent lors du financement des biens et services publics. Plus concrètement nous nous intéressons au financement des biens public par des contributions volontaires. Bien que la théorie économique prédise un comportement de resquilleur et ainsi une provision inefficace, nous observons dans beaucoup d'expériences que les participants sont prêts à contribuer plus que ne le prédit la théorie économique. Nous identifions des conditions qui sont favorables à un haut niveau de contribution.

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Paper provided by CIRANO in its series CIRANO Working Papers with number 2000s-37.

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Date of creation: 01 Oct 2000
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Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2000s-37

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Keywords: Public goods; experimental economics; Biens publics; économie expérimentale;

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  1. Groves, Theodore & Ledyard, John O, 1977. "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 783-809, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Kenneth S. Chan & Stuart Mestelman & R. Andrew Muller, 1998. "Voluntary Provision of Public Goods," McMaster Experimental Economics Laboratory Publications 1998-02, McMaster University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "A Theory of Social Interactions," NBER Working Papers 0042, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Chan, Kenneth S. & Godby, Rob & Mestelman, Stuart & Muller, R. Andrew, 1997. "Equity theory and the voluntary provision of public goods," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 349-364, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Claudia Keser, 2000. "Strategically Planned Behavior in Public Good Experiments," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-35, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  6. Bohnet, Iris & Frey, Bruno S., 1999. "The sound of silence in prisoner's dilemma and dictator games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 43-57, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Dickinson, David L., 1998. "The voluntary contributions mechanism with uncertain group payoffs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 517-533, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Sefton, Martin & Steinberg, Richard, 1996. "Reward structures in public good experiments," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 263-287, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 1999. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
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  11. Kenneth S, et al Chan, 1996. "The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods under Varying Income Distributions," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(1), pages 54-69, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Myles, Gareth D., 2000. "Wasteful government, tax evasion, and the provision of public goods," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 51-74, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Josef Falkinger et al., 2000. "A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 247-264, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Diamond, Peter A & Hausman, Jerry A, 1994. "Contingent Valuation: Is Some Number Better than No Number?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 45-64, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Keser, Claudia, 1996. "Voluntary contributions to a public good when partial contribution is a dominant strategy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 359-366, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Kahneman, Daniel & Tversky, Amos, 1979. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(2), pages 263-91, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1987. "Incentives and the allocation of public goods," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 10, pages 537-569 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Keser, Claudia & van Winden, Frans, 2000. " Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 102(1), pages 23-39, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Barro, Robert J, 1974. "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(6), pages 1095-1117, Nov.-Dec.. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Andreoni, James, 1990. "Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(401), pages 464-77, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation," IEW - Working Papers iewwp004, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
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  22. Falkinger, Josef, 1996. "Efficient private provision of public goods by rewarding deviations from average," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(3), pages 413-422, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Claudia Keser & Frans A.A.M. van Winden, 2000. "Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-011/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
  24. Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. Portney, Paul R, 1994. "The Contingent Valuation Debate: Why Economists Should Care," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 3-17, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  26. Oakland, William H., 1987. "Theory of public goods," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 9, pages 485-535 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  27. Andreoni, James, 1993. "An Experimental Test of the Public-Goods Crowding-Out Hypothesis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1317-27, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  28. Gachter, Simon & Fehr, Ernst, 1999. "Collective action as a social exchange," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 341-369, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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