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Voluntary participation and cooperation in a collective-good game

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  • Kene Boun My
  • Benoît Chalvignac

Abstract

We study the effect of voluntary participation in the context of a collective-good experiment. We investigate whether the freedom to participate in the game or not increases contribution levels and enhances their evolution. The analysis of two voluntary participation treatments supports a positive effect of an attractive exit option on both contribution levels and their sustainability. We conclude that the voluntary contribution mechanism can provide sustainable cooperation levels and that the usually observed decay of average contribution levels can be counteracted by voluntary participation in the game..

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg in its series Working Papers of BETA with number 2009-01.

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Date of creation: 2009
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Handle: RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2009-01

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Keywords: Collective Goods; Cooperation; Voluntary participation ; Laboratory experiments.;

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  1. Isaac, R Mark & Walker, James M, 1988. "Communication and Free-Riding Behavior: The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, Western Economic Association International, vol. 26(4), pages 585-608, October.
  2. Esther Hauk, 2003. "Multiple Prisoner's Dilemma Games with(out) an Outside Option: an Experimental Study," Theory and Decision, Springer, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 207-229, May.
  3. Talbot Page & Louis Putterman & Bulent Unel, 2002. "Voluntary Association in Public Goods Experiments: Reciprocity, Mimicry and Efficiency," Working Papers, Brown University, Department of Economics 2002-19, Brown University, Department of Economics.
  4. Masclet, D. & Noussair, C. & Tucker, S. & Villeval, M.C., 2001. "Monetary and Non-monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1141, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  5. R. Isaac & James Walker & Susan Thomas, 1984. "Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 113-149, January.
  6. Giorgio Coricelli & Dietmar Fehr & Gerlinde Fellner, 2004. "Partner Selection in Public Goods Experiments," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), Peace Science Society (International), vol. 48(3), pages 356-378, June.
  7. J. Ledyard, 1997. "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research," Levine's Working Paper Archive 509, David K. Levine.
  8. Isaac, R Mark & Walker, James M, 1988. "Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 103(1), pages 179-99, February.
  9. Karl-Martin Ehrhart & Claudia Keser, 1999. "Mobility and Cooperation: On the Run," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO 99s-24, CIRANO.
  10. Isaac, R. Mark & Walker, James M. & Williams, Arlington W., 1994. "Group size and the voluntary provision of public goods : Experimental evidence utilizing large groups," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 1-36, May.
  11. Claudia Keser & Frans A.A.M. van Winden, 2000. "Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers, Tinbergen Institute 00-011/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  12. Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Keser, Claudia, 1999. "Mobility and cooperation: on the run," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim 99-69, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  13. Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
  14. Claudia Keser & Claude Montmarquette, 2004. "Voluntary Teaming and Effort," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO 2004s-49, CIRANO.
  15. Roberto Burlando & Francesco Guala, 2005. "Heterogeneous Agents in Public Goods Experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 35-54, April.
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Cited by:
  1. Alexia Gaudeul & Paolo Crosetto & Gerhard Riener, 2014. "Fear of being left alone drives inefficient exit from partnerships. An experiment," Jena Economic Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics 2014-012, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  2. Paolo Crosetto & Alexia Gaudeul & Gerhard Riener, 2012. "Partnerships, Imperfect Monitoring and Outside Options: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Jena Economic Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics 2012-052, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena, Max-Planck-Institute of Economics.
  3. Benoît Chalvignac, 2013. "Partnership and trust in gift-exchange games," Working Papers of BETA, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg 2013-18, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  4. Mohamed Bchir & Marc Willinger, 2013. "Does a membership fee foster successful public good provision? An experimental investigation of the provision of a step-level collective good," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 157(1), pages 25-39, October.
  5. Mohamed Ali Bchir & Marc Willinger, 2009. "Do clubs foster provision success ?," Working Papers, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier 09-19, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Dec 2009.

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